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
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES TOWARD
U. S. - P. R. C. RELATIONS SINCE 1971.

Charles Frederick Gore

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THESIS

JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES
TOWARD
U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS SINCE 1971

by

Charles Frederick Gore

March 1978

Thesis Advisor:

C. A. Buss

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Japanese Perspectives
toward
U.S.-P.R.C. Relations Since 1971

by

Charles Frederick Gore
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., University of North Carolina, 1969

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1960's and very early 1970's, formal relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China were in a state of suspension. Then, in July 1971, President Richard Nixon stated publicly that he planned to visit Peking the following year. This announcement, which signalled a turning point in Sino-American relations and a move toward normalization, took American allies in Asia by surprise, especially Japan. Through Japanese eyes, any policy change between her strongest ally and a communist neighbor was extremely significant.

Since Japan is the leading industrial nation in Asia, and since Japanese and U.S. interests are harmonious, it is vital that we understand Japanese perspectives on U.S. foreign policy just as we expect Japan to understand our perspectives on her policies. The lack of complete understanding by the U.S. was typified by the "Nixon shocks." Treatment of Japan as an equal partner is a basic requirement for maintaining the cooperative relationship which is essential for achieving the purposes of both nations.

It must be recognized that when we use the word "Japan", we refer to the official statements of policy which come from government officials. However, this is not a complete or adequate indication of the feelings or view of the articulate members of the total Japanese society. There

are groups within and outside government which exert significant influence on the process of decision-making.

The objective of this thesis is to examine Japanese perspectives of U.S.-P.R.C. relations since 1971 through the eyes of interest groups which have a significant foreign policy role in Japan. It is vital that Americans understand these perspectives in light of the potential for improved Sino-American relations in the near term.

The paper will begin by highlighting some aspects of Japan's foreign policy: her national interests, the four-power equilibrium in East Asia (U.S., Soviet Union, P.R.C., and Japan), Japanese security problems vis-a-vis other Pacific countries and defense problems and capabilities. The second chapter will continue the discussion of foreign policy by analyzing the roles of the major actors, including the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), the opposition parties, the central bureaucracy, economic community and public opinion.

To provide a basis for later sections of the paper, Chapter Four looks at the development of U.S.-P.R.C. relations from 1949 to the present, covering the periods of the Korean War, the Cold War, Vietnam and the Nixon Doctrine.

The fifth chapter traces the evolution of interest group policies towards the U.S. and China from 1949 to 1970. Against this background, the next chapter examines the attitudes of these groups with respect to some major

issues in current Sino-American affairs (normalization of relations, trade and resources, ideological conflict and strategic balance).

The final chapter tabulates anticipated reactions of Japanese interest groups to future U.S.-P.R.C. policy developments.

Japanese news organizations give extensive coverage to political events in Japan in the English language, and both U.S. and Japanese official agencies make available public documents for English language readers. This wealth of information enables the student adequately to cover all facets of political viewpoints needed for this research in spite of the limitation of not being able to consult the Japanese materials in the language of origin.

II. JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: SOME PERSPECTIVES

All nations have characteristics which shape their national interests. In Japan's case, these characteristics are clear-cut. Japan is a small island country close to the Asian mainland. She has few natural resources but is highly industrialized. Although she is Westernized, the roots of Japanese civilization run deep in Asia. In World War II Japan was defeated by the United States and under the American occupation severe military restrictions were imposed under Article Nine of her Constitution. It reads in part:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.²

The first characteristic is primary and largely shapes Japanese interests. Ideally, Japan should control the surrounding seas in order to ensure her security. Since World War II, however, she has relied on the U.S. for carrying out that task.

Sea control also relates to Japan's high degree of industrialization and lack of resources in that the security

¹ For footnotes please see page

of her shipping lanes is vital to the economy. Japan must export in great quantities to pay for her needed fuel and raw materials. A hostile power able to cut off this influx of indispensable resources by sea could paralyze Japan. Because of U.S. naval predominance in the Pacific, Japan's only sensible security policy has been a close relationship with the United States.³

Therefore, the Japanese government in 1975, in fulfilling this primary responsibility for protecting the sea lanes, established two shipping zones--designated as southwest and southeast--extending not quite 1,000 nautical miles from Japan. Future defense, the government argued, should hinge on a strengthened anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability within the Maritime Self-Defense Force. Furthermore, the strength of the ASW force should be decided by Japan alone and not be based upon a "division of labor" with the U.S. Navy.⁴

In addition to maintaining sea lines of communication, it is also essential to Japan that she operate in a trading system which allows Japan as much free trade as possible. In the words of one Japanese official, "...prior to World War II there were boycotts against and several limitations on imports of Japanese goods and limitations on the export to Japan of such things as wool, scrap iron and oil. In response...the Japanese tried to create a Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere for the country's survival. But it failed miserably. Ironically, Japan got in defeat what she

wanted."⁵ This vital Japanese interest in a free-trading system has become more important as Japan's trade becomes more global in nature and is the basis for her call for the separation of politics and economics.

There is considerable debate as to the importance of the Korean Peninsula to Japanese security. Traditionally, Japanese refer to Korea, whose tip is only 120 miles from Kyushu, as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. But modern science has altered this historic relationship. Such distinguished observers as Edwin Reischauer, have implied that South Korea is no longer vital to the defense of Japan. He declared that South Korea is not vital to the U.S. and that Japan is vital to the U.S. It therefore seems to follow that South Korea is not fundamental to the defense of Japan.

The Korean Peninsula has figured prominently in Japanese military history. The Mongols twice attempted invasions of Japan from Korea in the 13th Century, and both the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 were fought largely over the mastery of Korea. At the present time, 600,000 Koreans live in Japan, and their loyalty is divided between the two Korean governments. If a conflict should ensue on the peninsula, the Japanese could well have their hands full containing these minorities.

Adding to the Japanese national interest in Korea are the substantial economic ties between the two countries. In sum, while Korea may not be a vital interest for the survival of Japan, the presence of a friendly government

on the Korean Peninsula is important to Japanese security. Many Japanese, emotionally as well as rationally, regard it as such. Since the U.S. has a mutual defense treaty with Korea, Japan has not had to bear responsibility for possible military measures to safeguard her interests there.

Keeping these security interests in mind, let us now look at the relative equilibrium of the four major powers in East Asia and the Pacific with special attention to Japan's current attitudes toward the U.S. and the P.R.C.

The four major powers in East Asia today are the U.S., the Soviet Union, the P.R.C. and Japan. This quadrilateral of states seems relatively stable in that neither war between the great powers nor a significant shift in alignment seems likely in the short term, although areas of conflict exist in Korea, Taiwan, the Sino-Soviet border and Southeast Asia. Tensions in Korea have not magnified to the point of the renewal of hostilities, and the Taiwan Straits have calmed somewhat over the past twenty years. Prospects between the two great communist powers are difficult to judge, but neither would appear to have much to gain from a military confrontation. In Southeast Asia some turmoil will continue over the next decade but scarcely to the extent of warranting the use of force in the region by any of the four powers. Each will maneuver to improve its position by its policies toward other members of the Big Four and by competition in Southeast Asia, but none appears likely to possess

in the near future both the power and the will to upset by force the underlying stability of the four-power system.⁶

It makes little sense for Tokyo to alter its alignment within the present East Asian power quadrilateral. While Japan will try to improve its relations with China and the Soviet Union, it is extremely doubtful that it will shift its basic economic and security ties to either of them. Japan is dependent upon the noncommunist world for markets, technology and raw materials, none of which can be provided in large quantities by the P.R.C. or Russia in the near future. Furthermore, despite their cultural ties to China, most Japanese feel comparable affinity for Americans and Western Europeans, whose societies are, like Japan's, open and democratic. It should also be noted that Japan's economic success can be largely attributed to the benefits of the security provided by the U.S.

A feeling of insecurity, perhaps spawned by a withdrawal of U.S. defense commitments in Asia, would compel Japan either to look elsewhere for a military ally or assume full responsibility for its own defense. Both developments would tend to de-stabilize East Asia. A security arrangement between Japan and either communist power would heighten the other's anxiety and lead to an arms escalation. On the other hand, a heavily-armed Japan would revive old fears of Japanese militarism and profoundly alter the Asian power picture.

Thus the stability of the East Asian power system depends to a significant degree upon the U.S. maintaining a satisfactory security relationship with Japan. This requirement is presently being met by the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

The American-Japanese alliance has served as the foundation of Japan's national policies for the past 25 years. It has made possible Japan's rise from defeat to affluence; it secured for the U.S. close diplomatic cooperation with the leading industrial state in Asia; and it provided a basis for the massive and flourishing trade between the two nations.⁷ There have been strains in the relationship, since some citizens in both countries oppose certain aspects of the alliance, but in general it has worked extremely well.

To understand the U.S.-Japan alliance from Japanese eyes, one must look at several factors. First, security. Japan has a combination of physical and psychological vulnerabilities. The country lacks strategic depth, having a land mass of approximately 143,000 square miles and a 16,500 mile coastline. No point in Japan is more than 75 miles from the coast. Also, about half its population is concentrated around the metropolitan areas of Tokyo and Osaka-Kobe. The entire archipelago is within range of Soviet medium-range bombers and ballistic missiles. More importantly, however, are the psychological restraints on maintaining a strong defense capability. At the conclusion of World War II there was a bitter disenchantment with

the military. It was as if the Japanese people had said, "We tried the military way and it did not work." Although somewhat tempered, this attitude still persists. Moreover, Japanese leaders are painfully aware that postwar anti-Japanese feelings are still very much alive in Asia and could easily be exacerbated by a major military build-up.

The second factor to be considered is the strong economic relationship between the U.S. and Japan. As with the security arrangements, there is more Japanese dependence upon the U.S. than vice versa. While the U.S. took 24% of Japan's exports in 1976, Japanese imports from the U.S. amounted to only 8% of American exports. Not only is Japan heavily dependent upon the U.S. market, but if transactions with American-owned firms elsewhere in the world, U.S. investments in Japan, the flow of advanced technology from the U.S. to Japan and invisible receipts from tourism and other sources are included, at least 50% of Japan's foreign economic relations depend directly or indirectly on the U.S.⁸

The third factor in understanding Japanese perspectives on the U.S.-Japan alliance is the domestic political situation. As the only political party to hold power in Japan over the past thirty years, the conservative Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) has been a buttress for the close association with the U.S. Although its majorities in both houses of the Diet are paper-thin, the opposition parties are so divided that a unified opposition seems unlikely in

the near term. In the event that one of the opposition parties or a coalition were to come to power, it is not clear whether or not Japan would abrogate the security treaty. A delicate change has recently been perceived in the party platforms of the minority parties, excepting the Japan Communist Party (JCP), on the handling of the treaty. They now suggest its abolition after negotiations with the U.S. instead of prompt and unilateral abrogation. Given the likelihood that the LDP will continue in power in the foreseeable future, a recent newspaper poll of the LDP Foreign Policy Commission, an important party organization responsible for drafting policy, is enlightening. The 61 members of the commission were asked whether they believed that Japan should continue to depend on the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Among the 46 members who replied in writing, all but three responded positively.⁹ A public opinion survey by another newspaper revealed similar attitudes among private citizens. In response to the question, "In the post-Vietnam era do you think Japan should continue to support the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty?" 61% of the respondents replied yes, 11% replied no and 27% had no opinion.¹⁰ One may conclude that, under present conditions, there is widespread support for continuation of the alliance.

There are numerous forces at work which will test the alliance in the future. The economic confrontation between the U.S. and Japan began in earnest during the recession year of 1970. Faced with a reduced domestic demand, Japan

increased her exports. The increased flow of Japanese goods into the U.S. was not answered by a rise in American exports to Japan, thus producing a growing deficit in the U.S. balance of trade between the two countries. Although not currently in a recession, both economies are operating at less than peak, and the U.S. deficit with Japan in 1977 was in the neighborhood of eight million dollars. The ability of the U.S. and Japan to solve this trade imbalance on a bilateral basis will play a major role in future relationships.

Another factor which may alter the alliance is the changing world situation. Japan will have to discard her passive foreign policy because her economic power dictates that she should make a greater contribution to the functioning of the world economy, more than has been made in merely following U.S. leadership. In the era of detente, Japanese diplomacy will require more flexibility and imagination than in the Cold War days, particularly in achieving better relations with her communist neighbors.

The last force acting to weaken the U.S.-Japanese alliance involves Japanese uncertainty over U.S. intentions in Asia. Although the Japanese approve of the relaxation of tension in East Asia that the U.S. detente with China has brought, they are uncertain what the new U.S. relationship with China portends for their relations with the U.S. The "Nixon shock" of 1971 had a profound effect upon the Japanese leadership. Since then and up to the unilateral U.S. announcement of its phased troop withdrawal from Korea, the

Japanese grew increasingly fearful that the U.S. was being less than candid with them on China and other crucial issues. Some Japanese, noting the more relaxed view of the U.S.-Japan security treaty taken by Peking in 1972-1973, suspect that the U.S. and China have agreed to cooperate in suppressing Japanese militarism. Others surmise that the ultimate aim of American policy is to move the U.S. to a diplomatic position equidistant between Japan and China. Japanese uneasiness and uncertainty will be intensified if U.S. relations with the P.R.C. expand, particularly if friction between the U.S. and Japan increases and rivalry between Japan and China in East Asia grows.¹¹

In sum, although the U.S.-Japan alliance currently has strong support in both countries, there are some difficult problems, the solution to which will require close bilateral cooperation. Some American observers, pointing to the inequality of the relationship, feel that the Japanese have no alternative other than to maintain close ties with the U.S. Dissatisfaction with excessive dependence on the U.S. is a strong motivation for Japanese leaders to seek a more independent role for Japan. Thus it would be unwise to assume that the manifest advantages to Japan of a continuing close association with the U.S. and the difficulty of finding a desirable alternative will necessarily guide the Japanese. Indeed, one Japanese intellectual, Masataka Kosaka, argues "...improvement of relations with the Soviet Union precisely because her policy is so different from

that of the U.S., would widen the options for Japan. Thus, it is only when Japan achieves better relations with the Soviet Union than the U.S. with China that her voice will be heard."¹²

To a degree exceeded only by relations with the U.S., China has been central to the foreign policy debate in Japan. Few Japanese see the P.R.C. as a military threat. Yet extraordinary emotional and symbolic importance surrounds the China issue for all politically articulate groups. China stands as a revolutionary, nuclear-armed Asian power, at times directly competing with Japanese interests, as the critical key to war or peace in the region, as the world's largest untapped market and as a nation with which cultural-historic connections are profound. That the issue transcends party lines is evident from the composition of the groups which pressed for early normalization of relations with Peking--a coalition of nostalgic, conservative Sinophiles from the prewar era, opportunistic businessmen in search of the legendary China market and left-wing Maoist revolutionaries.¹³

Despite the cultural affinity there is some abrasiveness in the attitudes of the Japanese and Chinese toward one another. The Chinese feeling of superiority--the attitude of aristocrat--comes from centuries of cultural preeminence. The Japanese attitude, that of a self-made man, proud of having reached the top through his own efforts, is somewhat patronizing toward the old aristocrat fallen on hard times, yet not entirely confident.¹⁴

There appear to be distinctly different motives behind Japan and China's movement to warmer relations. The Japanese are interested primarily in promoting a good-neighborly relationship and in particular in developing bilateral trade and economic relations. China, it seems is conducting its relations with Japan mainly in light of the conflict with the Soviet Union. Since the normalization of relations in 1972, the Chinese do not talk anymore about the revival of Japanese militarism or about Japan's economic aggression in Southeast Asia, and they accept the present U.S.-Japan security treaty.¹⁵

Japan and China are engaged in a territorial dispute, primarily concerning resources. In 1970 China claimed sovereignty over the tiny, uninhabited Senkaku Islands, positioned between the Ryukyu Islands and mainland China. It is thought that oil may lie under the ocean in that vicinity. China also is not pleased with the joint Japanese-South Korean oil venture south of the Korean Peninsula. China claims rights over that area since it sits on the continental shelf. But these disputes are low-key and so far have not significantly hindered Sino-Japanese relations.

The growth of Japanese economic power, the changing U.S. role in East Asia and the rapprochement between the U.S. and China have caused Tokyo and Peking to begin rethinking their relationship with each other.¹⁶ The result was an agreement reached in September, 1972, in which Japan recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate

government in China, diplomatic relations were established between Tokyo and Peking and diplomatic relations were severed between Tokyo and Taipei. Shortly thereafter, Japan and Taiwan made an unofficial agreement to permit most affairs between them to continue. Nonofficial organizations were set up in Japan and Taiwan, staffed largely by diplomats on leave of absence from the two countries, responsible for "promoting the development of the two nations' economic, trade, technological, cultural and other mutual relations" and for "protecting the lives, property and interests" of nationals.¹⁷ Japanese economic relations with Taiwan are substantial. 1976 trade totalled \$3.5 billion, and Japanese loans and interests in Taiwan are about \$400 million. It should be noted that Japanese interests on the island are sheltered to a large degree by the U.S.-Republic of China security treaty.

Taiwan, therefore, has been set aside as an issue between Tokyo and Peking. Should the Chinese leaders push for a unification of Taiwan to the mainland, it could become a serious problem.

The principle force that may move the Japanese and Chinese to a close relationship is the complementary nature of their economies. Japan needs China's raw materials and China needs Japan's capital and modern technology. Japan is China's most important trading partner, accounting for 25% of China's foreign trade in 1975. But the rapid expansion of Sino-Japanese trade would be feasible only if there should be a radical change in Chinese economic policy,

including a willingness to accept long-term loans from Japan to pay for Japanese capital goods and technical assistance. China's present leaders do not seem disposed to such a policy, therefore Japanese government officials and businessmen do not expect dramatic trade increases. As a matter of fact, 1976 trade decreased by over \$700 million from the 1975 figures.

Some observers predict growing rivalry between Japan and China for leadership in East Asia. Japan's economic influence is expanding rapidly. China cannot hope to compete on that basis in the near future but may attempt to make political inroads. In any event, it is hard to predict differences which may arise between the two countries as their relations develop with the nations of East Asia.

The confrontation between China and the U.S.S.R. places Japan in a favorable bargaining position, since both sides are seeking closer relations with the Japanese. It allows Japan to seek economic policies favorable to itself, particularly concerning raw materials. Moreover, both China and Russia are content with the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, as they each would rather have Japan allied with the U.S. than the other. This triangular relationship places Japan in an extremely delicate position. Before expanding relations with China, she must weigh very carefully the Soviet reaction, not wishing to annoy her powerful neighbor. Thus Japan can enjoy the benefits of the Sino-Soviet conflict if she plays her cards adroitly.

Summarizing, most experts see a cautious improvement of relations between Japan and China in the near future. The quadrilateral balance dictates that there be no major shift towards China by Japan.

In addition to relations with the U.S. and the P.R.C. Japan has been concerned with the Soviet Union, which cannot be ignored in determining her own place in the four power equilibrium. While Japan does not want to cut herself off completely from the U.S. in trying to solve such issues as the development of Siberia, she wishes to keep as many options open as possible so that she will not become merely a puppet of the U.S. in whatever may develop in Soviet-American relations.

The development of Soviet-Japanese relations since World War II has been slow. Having failed in the 1950's to neutralize Japan, the Soviet Union began to reach an accommodation in the 1960's. Seen in the light of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the timing of the new approach coincided with the period when Moscow and Peking's differences came out in the open. The latest developments in Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations may move the Russians, increasingly isolated in Asia, to attempt a much closer relationship with Japan.

Any improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations since normalization in 1956 must be couched in economic terms. Trade between the two countries has risen from virtually nothing to over \$3 billion annually. In fact, Japan is

the U.S.S.R.'s chief Asian trading partner. The potential for growth is substantial. Japan needs Soviet raw materials and the Soviet Union requires technology and capital--among other things to finance the Siberian resource procurement program. Negotiations between the two countries on the Siberian oil and natural gas projects are currently stalemated for a variety of reasons, including reluctance on Japan's part to establish dependence on Soviet raw materials and unwillingness of Japanese bankers to sink billions of dollars into the project without U.S. backing. Japanese also take into account the vehement Chinese opposition to the project.

Despite these economic advances, Soviet-Japanese relations are still basically coldly formal for the following reasons. First, the Japanese people have a long-standing feeling of hostility for their northern neighbors. Russia has historically been seen as a menacing threat, and today most Japanese view the Soviet union as their primary potential military opponent. The memory of the last minute violation of the 1941 Neutrality Pact and entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war reinforced Japanese distrust and suspicion of Russians.

Secondly, the main obstacle to the signing of a formal treaty ending World War II hostilities between the Soviet Union and Japan is the northern territories problem. Japan claims the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which the Soviet government has agreed to relinquish upon the signing of a peace treaty, and also Kunashiri and Etorofu, the

southern islands in the Kurile chain. The Japanese legal case is not strong. Under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which the Soviet Union did not sign, Japan renounced all claims to the Kurile Islands. In 1955, however, during negotiations with the Soviet Union over normalization of relations, the Japanese government requested Kunashiri and Etorofu be returned. The Soviets refused, but diplomatic relations were established, nonetheless. In themselves, the four islands are not important in either a military or economic sense, but the territorial problem has an important symbolic value for both powers. The Soviet Union does not want to establish a precedent for other territorial claims against her, while Japan wants proof of Soviet sincerity in the form of peaceful settlement of the matter in her favor.¹⁸ Both sides are adamant and treaty negotiations have been suspended.

Yet another reason for the slow development of relations has been the fishing problem. Japanese fishermen have been frequently seized and harassed for allegedly intruding into Soviet waters. Recently, however, Japan and the Soviet Union signed an interim pact which allows Japanese fishermen access to the waters in question but sharply limits their quotas. Bargaining over long-term agreements are continuing.

Finally, Soviet attacks on Japanese re-militarization have served to dampen relations. The Soviets are probably genuinely concerned that Japan's growing economic clout,

coupled with the decreased U.S. military presence in East Asia called for by the Nixon Doctrine, may lead to increased military commitments by Japan.¹⁹ Still, Soviet leaders are publicly much more alarmed by the "Chinese threat."

In the near future, gradual economically-motivated improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations can be expected, but distrust will probably prevent a radical move closer together. Moreover, Japanese unwillingness to antagonize China will deter her from moving hastily. It appears unlikely that Japan will make a substantial shift in alignment toward the U.S.S.R. unless the four-power balance alters significantly.

Korea is the East Asian focal point of the interests of the four powers. In Japan's eyes, stability on the peninsula is essential to her own security for the reasons stated earlier. Here again, American military commitment has protected Japanese interests. If, however, the credibility of the U.S. pledge to defend Korea declines, Japan may be moved to re-evaluate its defense policy, which in turn would profoundly effect the East Asian power system.

The present policy of the Japanese government towards the Korean Peninsula is to strengthen cooperative relations with the Republic of Korea and, at the same time, gradually to increase contact and exchanges with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the fields of humanity, culture, sports and trade, so as to generate a correct mutual understanding; but not to recognize North Korea.²⁰ A number of

factors make this a difficult policy to carry out. Koreans retain bitter memories of the 36-year rule under Japan, the Japanese mass media are critical of South Korea's domestic human rights policy, and the large Korean minority in Japan, which is split between the two Koreas and is vocal in expressing support for the governments, obliges the Japanese government to face up to difficult political and diplomatic decisions.

Despite these hindrances, Japanese trading-company diplomacy has paid off. Japanese trade in 1976 totalled \$4.7 billion with South Korea and \$168 with North Korea. The 1977 pace is well ahead of the previous year's. Japanese businessmen also have significant investments in the South Korean economy.

The Japanese government, then, will do all it can to prevent conflict in Korea. In addition to the security aspect, domestic ramifications within Japan could result if the Korean situation flares up. Not only would a bitter political struggle ensue, with the LDP supporting South Korea and many among the opposition favorable to North Korea, but many Japanese might object to the use of U.S. bases in Japan for Korean operations. Whatever scenario develops, Korea, more than any single issue, has the potential to provoke a major change in the direction of Japanese defense policy.²¹

Relations with the nations of Southeast Asia have been of less than first-rank importance and the area is not

considered vital to the Japanese economy.²² Still, economic ties with the region are significant. In 1975, Japan exported \$6 billion worth of goods to Southeast Asia, 10.8% of her total. In return, Japan took \$5.5 billion of the area's exports, or 24%. The Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), which includes Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, is now Japan's second largest trading partner after the U.S.²³

Japan's problem in her relations with Southeast Asia is to avoid an excessive economic presence, opening herself to criticism of economic imperialism. For this reason and to solve the lingering memories of World War II, Japan is providing economic assistance to ASEAN. In August 1977 Prime Minister Fukuda promised \$1.5 billion in grants and credits to the ASEAN members. He received scant domestic praise, since many Japanese question the judgment of the government in promising the money when the economy is not completely healthy.

Following the statement of economic assistance, the Prime Minister delivered the so-called Fukuda Doctrine, which has been described as the most comprehensive statement of Japan's position towards Asia since World War II.²⁴ In his statement, Fukuda again rejected the role of a military power for Japan, said that "our (Japan-ASEAN) material and economic relations should be animated by heartfelt commitments to assisting and complementing each other as fellow Aseans," called for equal partnership between Japan and the

Association and, finally, insisted on fostering a "relationship based on mutual understanding" with the Indochinese countries.²⁵

Based primarily on economic motivation, Japan has a significant stake in Southeast Asian stability. Japanese sea lines of communication are particularly vulnerable in the area and a conflict could threaten them. Moreover, Japanese economic interests could only be hurt by increased tension.

Some observers feel that a confrontation between Japan's economic power and Chinese ambitions for political influence will occur in Southeast Asia. They reason that China will attempt to expand her sphere of influence over the region in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. Whether or not Peking will risk alienating Tokyo considering the dynamics of the Japan-China-U.S.S.R. triangle is difficult to predict.

In any event, taking into account her economic ties to Southeast Asia, Japan cannot take lightly her relations with the countries in that area.

Following the analysis of Japan's national interests in East Asia, it is appropriate to examine briefly her total defense policy. In essence, "Japan will depend on the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent...With this basic characteristic Japan's defense capability should be ready to deal with a contingency by denying others easy armed aggression. This defense capability, together with the U.S.-Japan security system, must form a defense posture that leaves no operational deficiency."²⁶

The 1976 defense outlay totalled less than 1% of the Gross National Product. During the past ten years Japan's defense budget has amounted to between 0.8 and 0.9 percent of her GNP. This percentage is small when compared to the U.S. and Soviet figures but considering the growth of the Japanese economy, it represents an increasing expenditure and an improvement in capability. As of March, 1976, manpower levels in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were as follows: ground forces 155,000, maritime personnel 40,000 and air forces 43,000. The country has 15.5 divisions, 168,000 tons of naval shipping and 610 combat aircraft.

The defeat suffered in World War II and the experience of nuclear bombing have created a very strong anti-military feeling in Japan. The Constitution renounces war and the government has adopted the "three principles" of nuclear policy: Japan will not manufacture, possess or permit the entry of nuclear weapons. The gradual strengthening of the country's self-defense forces indicates a decline in the people's military inhibitions. The Japanese have, according to public opinion polls, accepted the fact that the self-defense forces are permitted under the constitution. However, there is no conscription in Japan and the Self-Defense Force has difficulty in keeping its strength up to allowance. Not only are there domestic constraints on a significant military build-up. Many Japanese fear that the country's economic relations with Asian states would be hurt due to fear of revived Japanese militarism.

The people remain firmly opposed to acquiring nuclear weapons. In a 1973 poll, when asked "Do you think it is necessary or not necessary for Japan to have its own nuclear weapons for the defense of the security of its own country?", 20% of the respondents answered necessary and 66% not necessary.²⁷ Most Japanese defense writers feel that nuclear weapons would not increase Japan's security but would make her neighbors nervous, thus increasing tensions. Nonetheless, some observers feel that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan is inevitable.

In summary, most Japanese do not see any significant military threat and strongly oppose a large defense establishment. They believe that an increase in strength would divert funds from the economy, thus degrade the standard of living. Nonetheless, a change in the international system unfavorable to Japan could rekindle strong nationalist emotions and erode popular opposition to a stronger defense capability. If Japan perceives a great enough threat, perhaps from a loss of the American nuclear deterrent credibility or a unified, hostile Korea, there can be little doubt that she will act to insure her own security, regardless of what the Constitution says.

III. JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: THE ACTORS

The goal of this paper is to gain a better understanding of Japanese viewpoints regarding current U.S.-P.R.C. relations. There are many diverse groups in Japan which maintain opinions on this matter, but only those groups which can significantly affect foreign relations will be addressed here. This chapter will describe how each foreign policy actor contributes to the overall process, while later chapters will develop group perspectives on the Sino-American relationship.

A. LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)

Three groups comprise the "conservative leadership" of Japan: the ruling LDP, big business (zaikai) and the central bureaucracy. While the latter two exercise influence over the politicians, it is the elected members of the Diet who control Japanese foreign policy. As the highest organ of state power, the Diet, consisting of the House of Councillors (Upper House) and the House of Representatives (Lower House), through its majority party or coalition, selects the Prime Minister, who in turn appoints his cabinet. Unlike the U.S. Chief Executive, the Japanese Prime Minister's term of office may be terminated by the House of Representatives (but not by the Councillors). The Lower House prevails over the Upper House in other matters, including over-riding a defeated bill, making it clearly the more powerful of the two houses of the Diet.

The presence of a "one-and-a-half" party system in Japan (the LDP being the one and the minority parties being the half) has curtailed the Diet's parliamentary role. Since its inception in 1955, the LDP has won every Lower House election. The opposition parties have yet to singly or jointly mount a threat to this reign of power. Because LDP members adhere strictly to party line when voting in the Diet, policy is in effect decided when agreed upon within LDP circles. Understanding the inner workings of the LDP and its policy-making process is paramount to understanding Japanese foreign affairs.

The Liberal-Democratic Party was founded in 1955 when the two leading conservative parties merged. The new party continued to rely upon the traditionally conservative rural agricultural areas and the business community for its support. With the rapid modernization of Japan's industry in the decades of the 1950's and 1960's, more and more people congregated around the metropolitan areas. Since it runs counter to the party's interest, the LDP has been reluctant to bring the Diet constituencies into line with the population shift. Representation of the industrial centers has, however, been grudgingly increased. Because of the gradual erosion of its power base, the LDP's Diet majority has slid from an overwhelming position to a paper-thin one. Despite this decline in support, the opposition parties have yet to threaten the LDP's leadership, thus the conservative party remains by far the strongest in Japan.

The LDP maintains a very close association with the business community in Japan. Although the economic interest groups will be examined more closely in a later section of this chapter, the government-business relationship will be briefly defined here.

There exist a number of formal means through which the government and the business world exchange policy views. The large economic organizations prepare formal position papers on issues which interest them and submit them to the Prime Minister. The government has neither the time nor the expertise to adequately research all issues and often depends upon business to advise it of the best courses of action. The economic community also has seats on half-private, half-bureaucratic deliberation councils which have been set up around the ministries to discuss new policies. Another formal avenue is through party committees. Businessmen often appear before the committees and divisions of the LDP's policy research council to try to influence party policy.

Also important are the informal channels of communication between business representatives and government/party officials. The economic community has formed clubs around each important party member and government minister. During these club meetings ideas are exchanged and personal relationships are strengthened. LDP factional organizations are another extra-official means of communication. Business representatives will attend factional sessions called to

discuss various problems facing the country. Politicians and businessmen also form groups to promote a common interest, such as the Japan-Republic of China Cooperation Committee.

Why does the ruling party pay such close attention to the opinions of the economic community? As mentioned earlier, the government often depends upon the expertise of business to recommend sound economic policy. Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that big business is the LDP's principal source of political funds. One study found that a particular Dietman's average monthly expenses totalled about three million yen while his monthly net income (salary) was only about 600,000 yen.²⁸ Most of this discrepancy is made up by gifts from the Dietmember's koenkai (personal support group) and funds provided by the factional leader, who in turn receives substantial business contributions. Without a factional boss to bankroll his expenses, a member of the Diet would in most cases be hardpressed financially.

Political contributions are made to the LDP in three ways. Money is given to the party's central organization, to factions and to individuals. Because funds are made available to individuals and faction leaders, it is conceivable that certain interest groups could become closely affiliated with specific Dietmen or groups of Dietmen. This does not appear to be the case in the LDP, whose prime benefactor, the economic community, sees its interests as too broad to limit itself to favoring one faction or a few individuals.

The most powerful men within the LDP are the faction leaders. Contrary to public statements disclaiming the existence of factions within the party, the LDP is divided into cohesive, semi-permanent groups whose members are not difficult to identify. According to one observer, "The factions, built around a single personality, are in a basic sense autonomous parties, having their own independent sources of finance, running their own candidates under the LDP label, and regularly caucusing for discussion of political strategy and, occasionally, of policy matters."²⁹ It has also been noted that "Factionalism reflects the ambitions of the stronger political personalities for the posts of party President-Prime Minister and for the other ministerial or party positions that confer prestige, power and (usually) political longevity on those selected. It also reflects the policy differences and the varied special interest groups that are found within the wide political range covered by the parent party--though to a lesser extent, because a faction cannot afford to have too narrow a base of supporters or be committed to a restricted range of issues if its leader hopes to exert maximum influence or to reach the party presidency."³⁰

No faction contains a majority of Diet members. Therefore, a number of faction leaders form a coalition and elect one of themselves as party President. This ruling coalition is referred to as the "mainstream" of the LDP, leaving the remainder of the factions as "non-mainstream."

The coalition of factions constrains the Prime Minister in his task of party leadership since he must obtain the agreement of the other faction leaders prior to embarking on a new policy.

The presence of factional politics detracts from responsible and effective democratic government in Japan, according to some observers. Policy debate and decisions are carried out behind closed doors away from the public eye. These critics also feel that frequent Cabinet shuffles that reflect factional power battles hinder the routine business of the central government. On the other hand, others believe that the pluralistic style of LDP politics prevents an autocratic Prime Minister. Pseudo-attempts at party reform have been largely ineffective. Usually, the Prime Minister, dealing from strength and with an eye on public opinion, calls for party unity--naturally behind his leadership. The other faction leaders resist, not willing to sacrifice their power bases; the system continues.

Following the December 1976 elections the LDP House of Representatives factional breakdown was as follows: Takeo Fukuda 52, Kakuei Tanaka 42, Masayoshi Ohira 38, Yasuhiro Nakasone 38, Takeo Miki 32, Etsusaburo Shiina 11, Mikio Mizuta 12, Naka Funada 8, ex-Ishii 4.³¹ During the December 1976 Lower House elections there were 249 Liberal-Democrats elected plus twelve "independents" who are likely to side with the conservatives during voting. This combination gives the LDP a narrow majority in the 511-member

House of Representatives. A similar arrangement between the LDP and independents exists in the 252-member House of Councillors.

In the current LDP organization there are three formal decision-making bodies. These are the party conference, the assembly of the members of the Diet and the executive council. According to party law the party conference is "the supreme organ of the party." Included in its membership are all Diet members of the party and four representatives from each of the prefectural federations. The conference is convened regularly once each year or on special occasions. Despite its lofty *raison d'etre*, the party conference is in practice only a rubber stamp. There is generally little debate, and the meeting may last only a few hours. The conference exists to place the highest endorsement on the most important party policy decisions.

The second formal decision-making body of the LDP is the assembly of the members of both houses of the Diet. Party law says that the assembly is "to examine and decide especially important questions concerning party management and activities in the Diet" and "to substitute for the party conference in matters requiring an urgent decision." As with the party conference, the assembly does not usually come to grips with important issues. The decisions will already have been made in closed session, and the assembly is called to ratify those decisions. Sometimes party leaders will use the assembly to report actions taken or planned.

Approval by the assembly will probably be the last step in the policy-making process unless the matter can wait until the party conference convenes.

The executive council is the third formal decision-making organ of the party. This group "discusses and decides important matters of party management and Diet activities" and consists of about thirty men. The chairman of the executive council, along with the party President, secretary-general and chairman of the policy research council, is regarded as one of the top four men in the LDP. The importance of the executive council can be seen by the fact that it must approve recommendations of the policy research council before they become official LDP policy. Endorsement is not automatic. But, as one party official stated, "Foreign affairs are always delicate. While there are many opinions, nobody wants to take the responsibility of overruling the Foreign Ministry. Its opinion will usually carry the day."³²

In the foreign policy area, it is the foreign affairs section of the LDP's policy research council that appears to play a controlling role in determining what the party will formally sponsor in the Diet.³³ One LDP member stated "On daily business, it is the bukai (foreign affairs section) that is nearly always supreme. Afterwards, the only remaining problem in the Diet is dealing with the opposition parties."³⁴

The executive council of the LDP controls the policy research council by its power of appointment. The chairman

of the policy research council is appointed by the party President with the endorsement of the executive council. The chairman then appoints the heads of the various divisions, again with the approval of the executive council.

The meetings of the sections of the policy research council are used for policy debates. Decision-making within this framework tends to take the form of accommodation of external interest groups, the balancing of factional interests and the dominance of the current mainstream factional alliance headed by the party President.³⁵ Business groups, government agencies, LDP factions and intra-party interest groups (such as the Asia Study Group) appear to use the meetings of the foreign affairs section to argue their positions.

It would be simplistic to state that the foreign policy of Japan is completely determined in these closed meetings of LDP organs. The foregoing indicates, however, that the Diet does not take part in the initial steps of foreign policy formulation. In fact, the degree of Diet participation is determined by the LDP. If it chooses to disregard public opinion and political opposition, as it did with the ratification of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960, the LDP is presently in a position to push through any legislation it chooses.

B. THE PARTIES IN OPPOSITION

1955 marked the beginning of what was to be the two-party system in Japan but in fact became the "one-and-a-half"

party system. In that year the two conservative parties joined to form the LDP, and the left and right wing socialist parties became the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). These were to be the participants in the two-party system. The JSP, however, could not develop a threat to the conservative rule and the current multi-party system evolved. Currently, there are five parties in opposition to the government of Japan: the JSP, the Komeito (Clean Government Party), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the New Liberal Club (NLC). This section of Chapter Three will examine the role of the opposition parties in the foreign policy-making process in Japan.

1. Japan Socialist Party (JSP)

JSP membership today total about 50,000. The party holds 123 of the 511 seats in the Lower House and has 56 of the 252 members in the Upper House, more than any other opposition party. Normally, over ten million people vote for JSP candidates during an election. This support stems from several factors. The socialists have capitalized upon the peace-loving and neutralist feelings of Japanese people. The party officially stands for unarmed neutrality, thus strongly opposes rearmament and the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. More vital to the JSP's strength, however, is its affiliatin with Sohyo, Japan's largest national federation of trade unions. In fact, the JSP has been called the political arm of Sohyo, since it supplies two-thirds of the party's members, contributes enormous funds for Socialist

election campaigns and, more often than not, provides the candidates for election to the Diet (62% of the total JSP members of the Diet are also members of Sohyo and its constituent unions and a Neutral Trade Union Federation.³⁶).

While the JSP's dependence upon Sohyo represents its primary strength, this association also has stagnated the party's growth. Those people outside the unions such as unskilled workers and students cannot identify with the party's union image. The JSP's leadership realizes that it must increase its membership and appeal if it is to challenge the LDP. The manner of achieving this goal is a source of bitter controversy within the party.

The left wing of the JSP, which is oriented along Marxist-Leninist lines, advocates increasing the number of party members consistent with the principles of a working class party. The view held by the right wing maintains that if the party is to have any hope of coming to power it must shed its communist leanings and become a people's, not worker's, party. Tomomi Narita, the party chairman, although belonging to neither faction, seems to lean more to the left wing point of view. This inclination is consistent with the factional strengths within the party.

JSP formal organization is similar to the LDP's. The highest decision-making body of the party is the central executive committee. Beneath it are various special policy committees. The JSP holds National Congresses at which, unlike the LDP, lively personal and factional debates are held

in the open. The congress produces the Party's Action Policy which does seem to influence party leaders in their decision making. While the party congress may impress the Japanese people with its democratic flavor, it also exposes the JSP as divided and unsure of its future paths.

It should also be noted that the labor unions take advantage of their relationship with the party by influencing JSP policy. Union leaders coordinate their demands and present them to the party committees and executives. In formulating JSP guidelines, it is not clear whether the party or union leadership has the upper hand.

2. Komeito (Clean Government Party)

One of the newest members of the opposition group is the Komeito. Membership includes 120,000 Japanese. The Komeito is the second ranking party in opposition, as it has 55 members in the Lower House and 24 in the Upper House.

The Komeito was founded in 1964 under the sponsorship of the Sokaggakai, or Value Creation Society, a sect of Nichiren Buddhism. One of its goals was the creation of "Buddhist democracy," and the party advocated a basic policy of "centralism beyond left-right conflict." The Komeito leaders are all Sokaggakai members and about 90% of the party's members belong to the religious sect.

Since the Sokaggakai strives for increased individual happiness through faith and prosperity, most of its followers are from the lower classes of society. This appeal puts the Komeito in direct competition with the communist party for votes. Another reason for mutual hostility is

the clash between Buddhism and Marxism-Leninism. Due to its religious affiliation the Komeito attracts conservative voters, while its call for political reform also draws progressive votes. These two forces combine to give the Komeito a tight-knit, morally-conscious membership. However, as with the JSP, the party's strength is also its weakness. The Sokugakai is highly intolerant of other religions and this self-righteous attitude incenses many people.

Sensing the political impracticality of an attitude of intolerancy, the Sokugakai and the Komeito announced in 1970 their policy of "separation of politics and religion." The Sokugakai was said to be just one of the Komeito's supporting organizations, and the party was opened up to non-members of the religious sect. To the contrary, there is little doubt that the Komeito is still the political arm of the Sokugakai.

Since the Komeito is dedicated to improving life for the lesser-privileged in Japan, its basic platform has been reformist. Jointly with the JSP, it has attached the LDP's support for, and connections with, big business. The Komeito is neutralist, and opposes the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the close ties existing between Japan and the free world.

The structure of the Komeito parallels that of the Sokugakai. The Sokugakai organization has a central office headed by a President, who is then linked to local groups. The lowest cell is composed of five to ten households. The

entire organization campaigns for the Komeito candidates at election time. This religious-political task force represents a growing threat to the conservative rule in Japan today.

3. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)

The DSP, with 40,000 members, is a relatively small party. Nonetheless with 29 representatives in the Lower House and 10 men in the Upper House, it cannot be ignored politically.

The DSP was born in January 1960 with the right wing of the JSP bolted to form the new party. The underlying reasons for the split are yet today the basis for the ideological differences between the two parties.

The primary and most illustrative of the factors behind the split was the issue of ratification of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. The left wing of the JSP was for immediate abolition of the security arrangement. The right wing forces took the approach that sought compromise with the LDP, thus calling for conditional extension of the treaty in exchange for concessions. While the leftist faction of the JSP still attacks all opposing views, the DSP sees itself as a moderating force in Japanese politics--anti-LDP but also anti-communist. The democratic socialists picture themselves as responsible opposition, not "absolute opposition."

Although DSP representation in both houses of the Diet has fallen from its original 55 in 1960, the party still maintains the support of the All-Japan Labor Federation (Zen

Nihon Rodo Sodomei, or Domei for short), the second-largest Japanese labor organization. Domei is based on the private industry unions and has a great deal of say over DSP policies. The democratic socialists also have the support of some business circles, who see them as a counter-communism force.

DSP supporters are a wide-ranging group. According to an Asahi Shimbun poll of October 1976, 17.6% of the DSP's followers are industrial workers, 36% are clerical workers and 19.1% are self-employed businessmen. The party is also supported by right-wing farmers. The DSP has not garnered widespread progressive support because of its willingness to compromise with the LDP, which weakens the opposition as a whole.

The diversity of backers is reflected in the DSP's somewhat ambiguous position between government and opposition. Although the party has entered into temporary tactical coalitions with the Komeito and the JSP, in general it is more critical of leftist elements than of conservatives. DSP leaders have even indicated willingness to consider a coalition with the LDP, if necessary, to keep that party in power ahead of the JSP. This has led some critics of the DSP to label it "the second LDP."

4. Japan Communist Party (JCP)

The JCP has a membership approaching 400,000. There are 19 communists in the House of Representatives and 16 in the House of Councillors. The 1976 Lower House elections dealt a severe blow to the party as they lost 21 seats, over

half their members. Communists are consoled somewhat by the fact that their percentage of the popular vote did not decline significantly (10.5% in 1972 and 10.4% in 1976).

The JCP has worked hard to gain respectability, and today the party's top goal is to establish a reputation befitting a responsible political group in a democratic society.

In order to meet this goal, the JCP has taken a number of actions. It has stated that it does not advocate violent revolution or one party rule in Japan. The party has also taken an independent stance with respect to the world communist movement, foregoing close ties with both the Soviet Union and China. The communists counter charges of revisionism by saying that their policy is the correct evolution of Marxism-Leninism in Japan's case.

The JCP's present platform calls for a two-stage revolution. In the first stage, a popular front of national unity will rise to fight capitalism and imperialism. Once the old order is toppled, the second stage of building a Socialist state will begin. The communists emphasize that the revolution must be achieved through the will of the majority of Japanese.

Support for the JCP stems from the rapid growth of the economy and its side effects. People disenchanted by pollution, overcrowded cities and depressed wages were attracted to the communist cause. There is obviously competition between the JSP, the Komeito and the JCP for the attention of the discontented masses. The communists have become very active at the grassroots level by providing medical services,

legal aid and support for protest movements. These activities were instrumental in strengthening the JCP at the local level, where the communists have representation on 3,200 prefactual and municipal councils throughout Japan.

5. The New Liberal Club (NLC)

The newest opposition party is the NLC. This party was set up in June 1976 when six Dietmen withdrew from the LDP to form a new political group. These men reasoned that, in the wake of the Lockheed scandal, the LDP was incapable of reforming itself. The members of the NLC also were very likely disenchanted with the gerontocracy ruling the LDP and the seniority system prevailing in that party.

In its first election, the NLC scored a spectacular victory by coraling 17 seats in the Lower House. In the July 1977 Upper House elections the NLC elected four members, an increase of three. Although it is not yet clear who the NLC is hurting most, the LDP or the other opposition parties, its conservative philosophy and former LDP support is undoubtedly drawing some votes away from the ruling party. An Asahi Shimbun survey of October 1976 showed that 33.8% of the NLC supporters were university graduates as compared with 13.3% for the LDP.

The NLC has not yet shown itself to be anything more than a faction of the LDP. In fact, some members of the JSP and JCP suspect that the LDP and NLC are collaborating to keep progressive voters from supporting their parties. NLC policies vary from the LDP's in that its members advocate

financial contributions only to individuals (and supposedly practice this rule) and believe in two conservative parties since "representative government is strengthened by the existence of a plurality of political parties wedded to the cause of liberalism."

To date, the NLC has not made its position clear regarding coalition policies. The group's future is problematic. It may re-merge with the LDP when the latter's house is in order or it may develop into a bona-fide opposition party.

Because the policies of this fledgling political party are unclear, the NLC will not be included in later discussions of opposition party attitudes toward the U.S. and the P.R.C.

6. The Politics of Opposition

This subsection will address the coalition positions of the opposition parties and discuss the methods available to them for affecting Japanese foreign policy.

The JSP's official position is that a joint coalition of all opposition parties is desirable. This impractical stance was necessitated by the intransigence of the other opposing parties. While the JCP's basic strategy is to cooperate with the JSP, the Komeito and the DSP are amenable to a coalition with the JSP but not the communists. Thus, the socialists are being pulled from both the left and the right. So far they have declined to make a choice, saying that "during the fight against the LDP and monopoly capital it will become clear which of the DSP and the JCP will drop off."

The Diet's formal role in foreign affairs is defined by the Constitution. It is the sole law-making organ of the state, must ratify treaties before they become effective, and it may question the executive branch of government regarding the conduct of foreign policy. As noted earlier, however, since the LDP can count on a majority vote anytime, international affairs debates on the Diet floor or in committee meetings are merely charades. In the past, opposition techniques have taken the form of harassment. A favorite tactic is to boycott a session in which a bill is passed, then charge the conservatives with dictatorial undemocratic politics in hopes that public opinion will be aroused. In this manner, the government will get its way at the expense of a little tarnish on its image.

In a final note, J.A.A. Stockwin had this observation to make regarding the Japanese political scene:

...a model of alternating party politics has hitherto been singularly inappropriate to the Japanese context. Voting patterns have been stable rather than swinging, and so far as past experience at least indicates, the electorate can be seen as consisting of a number of exploitable segments. Each segment is the actual or potential clientele of a given political party (or set of candidates). When that segment has been fully exploited by a party, it is difficult for the party to progress any further, and, losing the momentum of its appeal, it is likely to begin to decline. As the JSP, and to a lesser extent the LDP, have lost electoral support, so other parties have moved in to exploit the situation thus created. However, this has meant a proliferation of opposition parties. Given the existing electoral system, each of them is able to get some representation from its limited "segment" of national support. This makes it extremely difficult for any one party to challenge the LDP effectively, while the prospects of their combining to defeat the government party are not good so long as personal, ideological and historical differences continue to divide them.³⁷

C. CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY

Earlier in the chapter, it was stated that the LDP, the business community and the central bureaucracy combine to form the conservative leadership in Japan. This section will discuss the foreign policy roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the two most important bureaucratic actors influencing foreign affairs.

Before examining these two powerful ministries it is important to understand some general characteristics of the Japanese bureaucracy.

Although the civil servants wield a great deal of power, they only make recommendations to the politicians of the ruling party (that is, the Cabinet ministers, who are political appointees, and Diet and party committees). The bureaucrats are essential to the decision-making process because of the wealth of information and experience they possess. They also provide some degree of continuity between Cabinet reorganizations.

A career in the civil service is highly regarded in Japan and some writers have characterized the bureaucracy as elitist. Competition for positions is keen and many young men entering the government are highly motivated to serve their country. Prestige is enhanced by the widely-held view that civil servants are neutral and impartial when compared with party politicians.

Upon retirement from government service, many high-level bureaucrats "descend from Heaven" to enter private industry

and public corporations. A smaller but significant number run for political office, mostly with LDP endorsement. By following these paths the civil servants remain within the Japanese power structure. The movement of bureaucrats into the private sector has been criticized as being corrupt, since it enables private business to "reward" a civil servant who has been helpful while in office. On the other hand, it is argued that this transfer keeps knowledgeable people in the upper echelons of the economy.

It is clear, then, that the traditionally-respected bureaucracy in Japan plays an important role in policy formulation. A closer look at two bureaucratic actors follows.

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

It is generally agreed that in Japan the economic ministries such as Finance and International Trade and Industry (MITI) are the most powerful. The foreign office has lost head-to-head battles with MITI over Japanese overseas policy, sometimes referred to as "trading company diplomacy." With each put-down, the foreign ministry suffers a loss of prestige. It also is frequently criticized for being subservient to the American point of view. These are some of the reasons why fewer men are taking the entrance examinations than in the past and morale has sagged.³⁸ But the foreign ministry has by no means been eliminated from participating in international affairs.

It is difficult to determine the exact importance of MFA in policy making. There are writers who state that the ministry dominates this area, while others claim its role is

marginal. It seems that there is no absolute truth in this matter, since MFA's recommendations are accepted or rejected depending upon the nature of the issue. In routine cases, the bureaucracy will make incremental changes, to which the politicians and outside pressure groups will give little notice. If the matter is politically sensitive, however, the ministry's rationally-based guidance may or may not be followed. One expert noted that "An important tendency that relates to the distinction between routine and controversial situations is that the number of participants within the ministry tends to be in inverse proportion to that of participants outside the ministry. In routine cases, relatively more ministry bureaucrats and relatively fewer outsiders participate, whereas in controversial cases, the opposite tends to be true."³⁹

Observers emphasize the importance of middle-level officials in the Foreign Office. Division heads in particular are said to be the men who are most heavily leaned upon. The upper echelons spend much of their time testifying in the Diet and tending to administrative affairs and thus are unable to stay current on all issues. Because the division head and his assistant have an up-to-date working knowledge of the situation, their guidance is usually endorsed by higher-level bureaucrats whether the situation is routine or not.

Bureaucratic jealousy and myopia are factors both inside and outside the Japanese Foreign Ministry. As noted earlier, MFA clashes often with MITI, which it feels infringes upon

its territory. While MITI is concerned with business aspects of foreign relations, MFA looks at the strategic and global factors. The bureaus and divisions within the Foreign Office also tend to be biased in their outlooks; the China division head urges a "forward-looking policy" toward the P.R.C., just as the First North American division head is sympathetic to U.S. viewpoints.⁴⁰

Although the mechanisms are present, there seems to be no ministry-wide policy coordination. The research and analysis department of the Foreign Ministry is tasked with comprehensive policy planning, but jurisdictional disagreements with other bureaus apparently hinder its work. The treaties bureau has picked up some of the policy coordination responsibility. Although it does not involve itself with policy making, the treaties bureau gives highly-respected legal counsel and advice on issues which are often beyond its purview.

2. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)

MITI is the smallest of the six organizations that make up the "economic bureaucracy" (MITI, the Ministries of Finance, Agriculture and Forestry, Transportation, and Construction, and the Economic Planning Agency). MITI's influence in Japanese economic matters is a complex and controversial subject both at home and abroad. While it is called a "department store of government" by some Japanese, few would complain about the country's post-war economic recovery, in which MITI played a big role. Meanwhile, foreigners have labelled MITI "the corporate headquarters of Japan, Inc."

It is important to see how this powerful ministry effects Japanese foreign policy.

MITI was established in 1949 "to formulate plans concerning fundamental policies for production, distribution, consumption and foreign trading of commodities under its jurisdiction." MITI's real power lies in the extension by the Diet of this basic regulation over numerous other commercial activities. MITI controls legally by its "license and approval authority." Even more influential, however, is the ministry's right to provide "administrative guidance" in the form of recommendations, requests, and advice. It must be understood that MITI's "guidance" has no legal binding.

The one aspect of administrative guidance which most effects Japan's trading partners is the "voluntary restriction." If Japan, under foreign pressure decides to decrease an export item MITI will decide how much each manufacturer will cut back.

Within the Japanese economic bureaucracy there is no single coordinating agency, such as the Office of Management and Budget in the U.S. Therefore,, each ministry jealously watches over its doman and adds to it if an opening appears. Behind Finance, MITI is generally regarded as the second most powerful and prestigious ministry in the government. MITI may orchestrate the vital trade balance, but its frequent adversary, Finance, handles international monetary policy and the budget. Still, MITI seems to have more of a voice in overseas policy.

Due to their parochial interests, MITI and the Foreign Office argue over many issues. MFA, having its eye on world-wide political as well as economic relationships, takes a predominantly liberal, open-door position on the area of trade. Since it has no natural constituency it may follow this "internationalist" line without fear of losing support. MITI, on the other hand, being responsive to the interests of the business community, has been traditionally protectionist on trade matters. It has long promoted increased trade with the P.R.C., clashing with the Foreign Ministry.

MITI is not a formal actor in the official foreign policy decision-making process. But because Japan's overseas policy has been so dominated by economics, MITI's trade decisions have, in many cases, determined the nature of the relations between Japan and other countries. Although not all-powerful, MITI is one of a number of important participants in Japanese foreign affairs.

D. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The economic community is the third member of Japan's conservative leadership. The relationship between government and business in Japan is unique in the capitalist world. "The business and political elites are linked together by their common social and educational backgrounds, residence in the capital, a thick web of personal ties, long experience in working together to promote the reconstruction of the country, mutual dependence and shared values and goals."⁴¹ Because of this close bond, it is essential to understand big business' effect on foreign policy.

The Japanese economic community can be divided into three groups or layers. On the top are the leaders of the major business organizations (zaikai), such as the Federation of Economic Organizations (FEO, or Keidanren). The second echelon consists of the industrial interests (gyokai), and the third division is made up of the individual corporations (kigyo).

Unquestionably, the zaikai is the most influential economic layer. As Prime Minister Ikeda once stated, "The government is the captain and the zaikai the compass of the ship."⁴² These business leaders determine the basic trends of the Japanese economy and thus the nation.

The FEO is the voice of big business and is the dominant force in the economic arena. All major corporations and financial institutions are represented (over 100 major national trade associations and more than 750 large corporations). The FEO's primary goal is to keep close tabs on all sectors of the business community and resolve conflicts among its members. The President of the FEO has been called the "Prime Minister of the zaikai" and his "cabinet" meetings are often attended by governmental ministers and other high-level officials. The FEO has 20 standing and special committees which are in constant communication with the LDP, members of the Diet and the bureaucracy.

Although business does represent the ruling party's prime benefactor, it would be incorrect to assume that money is the community's sole source of power. For the most part, business concerns in Japan do not function as pressure groups.

As discussed earlier, government and big business think very much alike and work together for a common goal--continued economic growth under a capitalist system. They consult closely on matters such as the national budget, taxation and trade.

The business community has resorted to pressure group tactics in the past when warranted. In the early 1950's the socialists were gaining ground on the two feuding conservative parties and the zaikai pressed for a merger. The Liberal-Democratic Party resulted. Segments of the business world also use pressure to obtain favorable treatment (such as rice growers urging higher rice tariffs). By and large, however, the nature of the government-business relationship is quite the opposite of adversary.

Presently, both government and big business agree that closest economic and political relations with the U.S. are necessary in order to attain their common goals. The China issue divided the economic community somewhat. While some of the individual companies had much to gain from closer P.R.C. relations in the 1960's and early 1970's, the zaikai felt that the overall long-term interests of Japan would be best served by going along with the U.S. policy of a near economic boycott of China. Obviously, pro-American business leaders lost some credibility after the "Nixon shock" of 1971 and were embarrassed by the U.S. "double-cross."

Like the other members of the conservative leadership, business is powerful but not omnipotent. "It's like a game of paper, scissors and rock," said Kono Keizo, a vice speaker

of the Upper House. "The businessmen have influence over the politicians, the politicians control the bureaucracy, and the bureaucrats keep the businessmen in line. It's a natural system of checks and balances."⁴³

E. PUBLIC OPINION

The relationship of Japanese public opinion and foreign policy is not easily understood. Because Japan is a democratic and open society, the people possess the means to make their views known to the government. But the use of this influence and the government's response to it are complex.

The Japanese people ordinarily do not become excited over political matters. Thus, while a survey may find that 78% of the respondents favored Policy A, it may not reveal that most of them would do nothing to encourage its implementation. Occasionally, however, the public does become aroused over an issue, as it did in 1960 over the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.

Surveys also show that foreign policy is traditionally less important to voters than domestic affairs. In a December 1969 poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun, three-quarters of the people questioned emphasized domestic issues (inflation, taxes, etc.) and only 14.5% cited foreign policy and defense matters most important.⁴⁴

Japanese are avid newspaper readers and are among the best-informed people in the world. Consequently, the press is a very influential factor in Japanese politics. The newspapers aggressively strive to keep the public current on all

issues. Although they all tend to be neutral in party politics, the Asahi leans slightly further left than the others.

The LDP probably did not greatly concern itself with the public viewpoint when its majority in the Diet was overwhelming. For example, despite the 1960 riots which caused the cancellation of President Eisenhower's scheduled visit, the conservatives rammed the treaty ratification through the Lower House and the Protest quickly subsided. The situation is changing. The LDP's support is deteriorating and one can assume that the ruling party will alter its policies to accommodate public desires in order to pick up voters.

Some observers think that many Japanese are just "letting off steam" when they protest against pollution, overcrowded cities and other side effects of the LDP's industrialization policy, and that these people will, in the end, vote for the party which has so markedly improved the quality of life in Japan. The LDP interpreted the December 1977 House of Councillors election as such a vote of confidence.

Although the evidence is not conclusive, it does appear that Japanese leaders have become more appreciative of public opinion over the past twenty years. The increased number of public opinion polls, both by the mass media and government, suggest that there is more awareness of the public's views on policy matters.

IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS

The previous chapters have discussed Japanese foreign policy perspectives and actors. This chapter will look at the development of U.S.-P.R.C. relations from 1949 to 1977. Later chapters will examine the viewpoints of the various interest groups in Japan towards the different steps in the evolution of Sino-American policy.

Our relationship with China is primarily based upon a long background of religious, cultural and humanitarian association...There is a foundation, and we believe a stable and lasting foundation, of friendship between the people of China and the people of the U.S....History will never judge that we have been motivated by anything other than a desire to serve what we honestly believe to be the welfare of the Chinese people.⁴⁵

These words were spoken in 1950 by John Foster Dulles, who later became Secretary of State and a very important China policy-maker. In the early 1950's many Americans believed in the myth of U.S.-Chinese freindship which Dulles espoused and could not comprehend how China could accept communism and thus reject the U.S.

Contrary to Dulles' words, the record shows that over the years, U.S. interest in China has been economic, religious or political. The lure of the potentially vast China market has been on the minds of American businessmen since the late 18th Century. The Chinese masses also attracted a great many U.S. missionaries who sought to introduce not only Christianity but, in addition, American political institutions. And politically it was expedient for the U.S. to

align itself with China in the 1930's and early 1940's to oppose Japanese expansion.

For their part, the Chinese have not excluded the U.S. from the anti-foreign feelings which have traditionally dominated their international outlook. This Chinese resentment of foreign meddling in their domestic affairs runs deeper than the ideological conflict between democracy and communism.

Therefore, Americans had no basis upon which to feel betrayed by the Chinese when a communist government was formally established in 1949.

When the communists, led by Mao Tse-tung, established control of the China mainland in 1949, the Truman administration sought to disengage the U.S. from the Chinese civil war. Three inter-related issues faced the U.S.: diplomatic recognition of the Peking government, admission to the United Nations and relations with the Nationalists on Taiwan.

Two general philosophies existed in the U.S. regarding diplomatic recognition. The Jeffersonian approach held that the U.S. should establish relations with any government which was in firm control and represented the will of the people. The Wilsonian philosophy was that recognition implied approval of a government's actions. The Truman administration, through Secretary of State Dean Acheson, cited Jeffersonian reasons in September 1949 for adopting the position that the U.S. would not extend diplomatic recognition to the P.R.C.

Many influential Americans were opposed to recognizing the communist government in Peking. The issue was largely

partisan, and the Republicans insisted that establishing relations with the P.R.C. meant abandonment of our war-time ally, Chiang Kai-shek. They also claimed that it would represent appeasement to the world communist movement. This "China bloc" in Congress was supported in its anti-Peking stance by the "China lobby," a group of Nationalist officials, their public relations agents and anti-communist Americans.

While these pro-Tiawan forces represented a minority viewpoint in Washington, they succeeded in arousing widespread anti-communist sentiment in the U.S. Even though the liberal press was generally in favor of establishing diplomatic relations, public opinion in 1949 and the early 1950's was such that recognition of the P.R.C. was politically impractical.

The fledgling Peking government exacerbated American hostile feelings by pursuing a vigorous anti-imperialist campaign against the West and by harassing consular officials in China. The communists were still attempting to consolidate their internal power during this period. They stirred Chinese nationalistic sentiments by emphasizing the threat of U.S. imperialism. The newborn P.R.C.'s foreign policy was guided by two basic doctrines--alliance with the U.S.S.R. and opposition to the Western imperialists.

Closely tied to the question of recognition was the issue of admitting the Peking government to the U.S. Both the Nationalists and the Chinese communists were using the U.N.

as a forum from which to argue their cases for legitimacy (the communists using Moscow as a mouthpiece).

The American government, in keeping with its policy of non-recognition of Peking, backed the Taipei regime. The Soviet Union, in turn, supported the cause of the Peking government. In an apparent protest over lack of admission of the mainland government, the Soviet ambassador walked out of the U.N. in January 1950.

Still, the P.R.C. did little to further its own cause. It isolated itself from the world community by stepping up its anti-imperialist propaganda, recognizing Ho Chi Minh's government in Vietnam and continuing to abuse U.S. consular property. The Soviet Union's refusal to be patient and follow parliamentary means to secure a U.N. seat for Peking hurt the joint communist effort. By taking this high-handed approach, many nations saw the world communist movement as being against representative government.

The third immediate issue which faced the U.S. government in late 1949 and early 1950 was the relationship with the government on Taiwan. Prevailing opinion within the administration was that the U.S. should in no way become involved in a civil war which had already been decided. Truman, supported by his Joint Chiefs, opposed sending any military assistance to the Nationalists. In January 1950 Acheson excluded Taiwan (and Korea) from the strategic line that he said the U.S. should be prepared to defend against communist aggression in the Western Pacific.

The administration opponents claimed that it was against the American way to abandon a loyal ally. Alongside the sentimentalists, others argued that under the new Asian situation it was strategically important for the U.S. to keep Taiwan from going under.

Thus, in the spring of 1950, the U.S. under Truman, encumbered by Congress and public opinion, followed a policy of "no involvement" in China's civil war. The emerging phenomenon of McCarthyism and the Korean conflict snuffed out any hope of U.S. accommodation with the P.R.C.

When the North Koreans attacked across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, a chain of events was started which froze Sino-American relations for two decades.

In the U.S. the thrust was taken as world communism on the march--the perils of NSC-68 were coming true. Whereas months earlier Korea had been omitted from the American strategic defense perimeter, the Truman administration now felt that North Korea threatened U.S. national security. When the President committed U.S. troops and supplies to the defense of South Korea the public rallied behind him. Simultaneously, the U.S. government reversed its stand on the Taiwan issue and dispatched the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Straits to prevent a communist attack. Chou En-lai denounced Truman's action as aggression against the territory of China and Mao Tse-tung is reported to have believed that the U.S. "openly exposed its imperialist face."

When the U.N. troops halted the North Korean advance and began moving northward, the new objective became the

unification of Korea under a democratic government. As the North Koreans retreated, the Chinese issued numerous private and public warnings that they would not stand idly by. The threats were ignored and less than three weeks after the Americans pushed across the 38th parallel, U.S. and Chinese troops clashed. In late November 1950 the communists launched a devastating attack which eventually forced the U.N. forces south of the 38th parallel.

Although still a matter of dispute, it seems clear that the P.R.C.'s intervention was primarily a defensive move rather than a conscious step toward world communist domination. The Chinese were convinced that an American-dominated government directly across their border was a threat to their national security.

By February 1951 the communist forces were stopped and, once again, U.N. troops moved northward. Against the wishes of his field commander, General MacArthur, President Truman decided not to advance the fight into North Korea, thus committing himself to a holding action. The administration now sought a negotiated settlement plus a U.N. condemnation of the P.R.C. as an aggressor nation. The General Assembly did approve the U.S. resolution in February, and in that same month, the U.S. concluded a military assistance pact with Taiwan, culminating the policy reversal of the Truman government. By June, fighting was stalemated around the 38th parallel and the Chinese agreed to a cease-fire.

The negotiations dragged on for two years before an armistice was signed in June 1953, three months following

Stalin's death. Hostilities broke out repeatedly during the negotiations with both sides sustaining heavy losses. In the end, however, a direct all-out clash between the U.S. and the P.R.C. was averted.

Whatever friendship between the two countries had existed prior to 1950 disappeared with the Korean conflict. To the Chinese communists, Americans were viewed as barbarians who threatened their way of life. Americans saw the Chinese as mindless, aggressive hordes under Soviet domination. Holding these bitter feelings, the U.S. refused to consider normalized relations with China and the Peking government had no interest in improved ties.

During this period the effects of McCarthyism also left a long-lasting impression on American China policy. It embodied all the emotional Cold War fears and fixed in people's minds the view that accommodation was appeasement. Moreover, it depleted the State Department of most of its China experts and greatly limited foreign policy flexibility. It was to take years for the effects of McCarthyism to fade from the policy arena.

The chief architect of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Far East policy was Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He commanded the President's full confidence. Dulles was a fervent anti-communist who firmly believed that communism, or even neutralism, was immoral. He shared the China bloc's convictions that the U.S. must hold the line against communist expansion in the Western Pacific. This one man's philosophy was to play a vital role in Sino-American relations during the 1950's.

U.S. fear of Chinese communist expansion seemed to be reinforced by developments in Indochina in the early 1950's. In 1954 the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietminh began a massive assault on the French stronghold of Dienbienphu. The alarmed U.S. government, amidst reports of Chinese army involvement, embarked on an all-out campaign to convince the American people of the danger posed to the Free World by this expression of Sino-Soviet expansion. However, Eisenhower did not want to intervene militarily without allied support and, not finding it, had to be content with sending supplies to the doomed French forces. It now appears probably that although the Vietminh did admittedly receive aid from Russia and China, there was no troop involvement.

The major powers met in Geneva in April 1954 to negotiate the fate of Korea and Vietnam. The American and Chinese positions remained unequivocal on the Korean issue and these negotiations collapsed. The conference then turned to Indochina and the U.S. declined to take an active part in the matter. The French had little choice but to admit defeat in Vietnam and withdraw completely. The outcome of the Geneva settlement caused the U.S. to again actively seek a collective defense treaty to prevent further communist aggression in Southeast Asia. This time Dulles was successful and in September 1954, the U.S., Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the forerunner of SEATO. Furthermore, the U.S. made a commitment to provide

military support to the South Vietnamese government. The Peking government condemned the new treaty as hostile to the P.R.C. and interference in the internal affairs of Asian countries.

The primary issue between the U.S. and China remained Taiwan. In August 1954, the communists attached the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Strategically unimportant, this small group of islands was a symbolic stepping stone for both the communists and the Nationalists. The U.S., while restraining Chiang Kai-shek from an all-out counter-attack across the straits, pledged to support the Nationalists against a communist invasion. In December, the U.S. and Taiwan signed a mutual defense treaty which authorized the U.S. to put men and equipment on Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. The Chinese communists continued to shell Quemoy and in January 1955 stepped up their activity by raiding the Tachen Islands. The U.S. Congress responded by endorsing Eisenhower's Formosa Resolution, which granted him conditional authority to employ U.S. armed forces for the protection of Taiwan, the Pescadores and other "closely related localities." The President also took this opportunity to suggest that he would use tactical nuclear weapons if war broke out in the Far East.

Three months later, in April 1955, Premier Chou En-lai announced that the P.R.C. was willing to enter into negotiations with the U.S. to "discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area." The reasons for this

policy shift are not clear, but the Soviet Union was also following a more conciliatory line toward the West following Stalin's death. As an informal truce descended upon the Taiwan Straits, the governments agreed to ambassadorial level talks in Geneva.

The talks yielded results, as both nations returned captured servicemen. The U.S. and China remained deadlocked, however, over the crucial issue of Taiwan. Peking claimed it was an internal China problem and Washington continued to support the legitimacy of the Nationalist government.

Throughout 1956 and 1957 China seemed to follow a more restrained foreign policy. At home, the Chinese leaders seemed to be less repressive as they implemented the "hundred followers" campaign. U.S. policy-makers, however, stood firmly beside their policy of denying the legitimacy of the Chinese communists. Dulles even refused the P.R.C.'s offer of a journalist exchange.

1958 saw the return of militancy to Chinese foreign affairs. In late 1957 Mao Tse-tung, perhaps heady over improving Soviet rocket technology, declared that the east wind was no prevailing over the west. The country was also undergoing the Great Leap Forward. In order to re-direct the people's attention from the new demands being placed on them, the Chinese leadership harped on the threat of western imperialism.

For whatever reasons, in August 1958, the communists once again stepped up the action in the straits by shelling and blockading Quemoy. Radio Peking warned that the mainlanders were going to "smash the American paper tiger and liberate

Taiwan." Eisenhower once again declared that the U.S. was prepared to defend Taiwan. Within days, the Chinese communists opted for the conference table. It has been speculated that Peking backed down because the Soviet Union, realizing its strategic inferiority, would not give full support to the Chinese "adventure." Just as in 1955, the U.S. and the P.R.C. would not compromise their Taiwan stances and the talks were inconclusive.

During the remaining years of the 1950's, Peking followed a foreign policy which alienated the American people. Signs of the Sino-Soviet split were growing and the Chinese were declaring themselves the true heirs of Marxism-Leninism. In contrast to the Soviet Union, they were ready to support all revolutionary movements against capitalism. Peking put this policy into operation by opening aiding the Pathet Lao in Laos and backing Ho Chi Minh's drive to liberate South Vietnam.

The U.S. remained committed to a policy of isolating the P.R.C. Along, except for a hesitant Japan, the U.S. maintained an economic boycott of mainland China. Every year, the U.S. opposed the entry of the P.R.C. into the United Nations. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, the U.S. must stand up against "the fanatical, aggressive, hostile and threatening International Communist regime of Peiping, an implacable enemy dedicated to the destruction of all the foundations upon which a free society rests."⁴⁶

1960 saw the election of a Democratic candidate as President of the U.S. Although there were some signs that John F. Kennedy felt that relations with China were too rigid, the new administration believed that public opinion still would not support accommodation. Kennedy's appointment of Dean Rusk as Secretary of State solidified the U.S. government's hardline against Peking.

The new President clashed first with the P.R.C. over Laos, where both countries sought to prevent each other from gaining influence. The U.S. backed the neutralist forces, while the Chinese supported the Pathet Lao, which seemed poised for a communist takeover. In April 1961, the rival forces agreed to a cease-fire and a 14-nation conference was called to negotiate a settlement. After a year, an agreement was reached by the signatories, including the U.S. and China, that Laos would be independent and neutral. Anxious to avoid a direct confrontation, the two powers had accepted a compromise setting up Laos as a non-aligned state.

In 1962, perhaps as a test of the new administration, the Chinese communists once again belligerently stated their intent to liberate Taiwan. They began to concentrate their forces across the straits in Fukien. Kennedy did not hesitate in supporting the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of committing the U.S. to the defense of Taiwan. He also added that "We are opposed to the use of force in the area. The purposes of the U.S....are peaceful and defensive." The President's words restrained both the communists and the Nationalists

and a crisis was avoided. Taiwan remained an intractable issue, however.

Two events of late 1962 further solidified the opposing positions of the U.S. and the P.R.C. In the Sino-Indian war, the U.S. gave prompt military assistance to India in what it believed was an effort to thwart communist expansion. Peking seemed to live up to its stated goal of only reclaiming borderlands when, from a position of clear strength, it unexpectedly announced a cease-fire and called for negotiations. The second event, the Cuban Missile Crisis, saw the Soviet Union accede to U.S. demands of strategic missile removal from Cuba. For this surrender, the Russian leaders were mercilessly attacked by Peking. Although relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union seemed to improve after this incident, China's position vis-a-vis the two superpowers declined.

In the early 1960's Washington was confused over the growing rift between the two communist giants. While the polemical warfare raged on between Peking and Moscow, neither side disavowed their military alliance. The prevailing feeling among U.S. leaders was that the split did not make communism any less menacing. In fact, a reckless, isolated China may have been more of a threat to expand in Asia.

Meanwhile, the matter of Vietnam was simmering. U.S. support for the government of South Vietnam grew out of a conviction that China was the real enemy behind the communist insurrection. When U.S. planes began bombing North

Vietnam in February 1965, the P.R.C. repeatedly warned that if the North were invaded by combat troops, China would be forced to enter the hostilities. Although Peking provided military and moral aid to North Vietnam, it restrained itself from sending troops across the frontier. Without direct Chinese involvement, the Johnson administration could not reason that U.S. forces were in Vietnam to counter Chinese communist expansion. Therefore the U.S. emphasized that it had to uphold its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

The Chinese continued to strenuously oppose American intervention in Vietnam. The U.S. imperialists were meddling in Asian affairs and, by their presence, were threatening Chinese security. Washington dismissed the idea that Peking could be worried about self-defense. Governmental leaders were so preoccupied with containing Chinese communism and maintaining peace in Asia that they could not perceive that China felt insecure with hostile American forces in Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam and Soviet troops on the northern border.

Domestic events in China prevented a warming of relations with the U.S. In 1964, the Chinese exploded their first atomic device, proudly joining the nuclear club. The danger of a Chinese nuclear attack appeared remote, but the American people could not escape a new sense of foreboding.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which began in 1965, exhibited to the world a confused, disarrayed China. As Mao sought to rejuvenate the spirit of communism in China,

the turmoil created a shifting, kaleidoscopic picture to the West. The People's Daily alternated bellicose outbursts with hints of possible accommodation. These events seemed to make the U.S. goal of Asian stability more remote.

Once the Vietnam peace talks commenced in May 1968, the feeling began to grow in Washington that a reappraisal of U.S. Far Eastern policy was required. Communism in China was accepted as more than a temporary phase, and the strength of China's nationalism was recognized. This more pragmatic outlook, however, did not free the U.S. from the network of security treaties and commitments it maintained for the containment of the communist movement. Further, the P.R.C.'s continued development of nuclear weapons highlighted the Sino-American rivalry. As President Richard M. Nixon took office in January 1969 there was no indication that a fresh approach to China was in the making.

Richard Nixon's pre-Presidential record had a distinctly hawkish, anti-communist tone to it. Immediately following his election, no signs were given that he had changed his position.

Yet, within four months of assuming office, the new President appeared to display a conciliatory mood towards the P.R.C. Secretary of State William Rogers stated that the U.S. would take the initiative to reestablish more normal relations with Communist China. Then, in July 1969, the State Department eased travel and customs restrictions for U.S. citizens traveling to China. Although these steps were small, they were significant.

For their part, the Chinese greeted Nixon's election by calling for renewed ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. The U.S. agreed, but the Peking government backed out at the last minute, ostensibly because of the defection of a Chinese diplomat to the U.S. It seems more likely that internal political power struggles caused China to renew the traditional attacks on the U.S. Nonetheless, the invitation did not go unnoticed by Washington, and the State Department calmly stated that it would stand ready to reopen talks whenever the Chinese changed their minds.

Then, in July 1969, on the island of Guam, the U.S. President enunciated what became known as the "Nixon Doctrine." He announced a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and, while reiterating U.S. interests in Asia, stated that the U.S. must avoid future military entanglements in that region. Additionally, U.S. allies in Asia were to assume more responsibility for their own protection against communism. Whether the reason was to placate American public opinion or to move closer to China, the prospect of a decreased U.S. military presence in their backyard must have greatly relieved Chinese leaders.

The 1969 border clashes between China and the Soviet Union brought home to the U.S. the severity of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The deepening cleavage opened up options for U.S. foreign policy with the two communist powers. Although Washington stated that it would remain completely neutral, the government realized that on a case-by-case

basis it might be able to apply leverage to promote its own interests.

In light of its conflict with the Soviet Union, China's leaders must have seen that they could benefit from improved relations with the U.S. During the late 1960's there was considerable fear in China that the Soviet Union would use the Czechoslovakian model in China. Warming conditions between the U.S. and China would possibly restrain Russia.

Aside from strengthening the country's position relative to the Soviet Union, the Chinese leadership probably realized that there were further potential rewards for improving relations with the U.S. Among these were a seat in the United Nations, better relations with Japan, a lifting of the U.S. economic boycott, greater worldwide prestige and, concomitantly, a weakening of Taiwan's position. Conversely, one disadvantage would be a loss of credibility as the avowed leader of the "Third World."

Even though the U.S. remained committed to Taiwan and opposed to entry of Peking into the U.N., there were some positive notes in 1970. At China's suggestion, ambassadorial talks were again renewed in Poland. The State Department also announced a partial lifting of the American economic blockade of China by approving the exchange of nonstrategic goods.

A major breakthrough in U.S.-P.R.C. relations came in July 1971, when President Nixon announced his intention to visit China. This development "shocked" many of the United

States' Asian allies, especially Japan, since it had been accomplished without their consultation. That same year the U.S. altered its position on U.N. membership for the P.R.C., and the mainland government was seated on the Security Council. Since the U.S. still maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, ambassadors could not be exchanged and the two countries set up liaison offices to conduct official affairs.

Since these events transpired six years ago, Sino-American relations have been in a holding pattern. Although Japan normalized diplomatic relations with China in 1972, there are yet some major stumbling blocks to formal U.S.-P.R.C. relations.

More than any other issue, Taiwan stands between China and the U.S. Peking demands that the U.S. abrogate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, sever diplomatic relations and remove all American troops from the island. In the Shanghai communique of February 1972, the U.S. acknowledged that Taiwan is a part of China and "reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."⁴⁷ The U.S. also affirmed its ultimate objective of the removal of all American forces and military installations from Taiwan.

The U.S. would like to improve relations with China by moving away from a commitment to Taiwan, but such a shift might cause consternation among its Asian allies, most notably Japan. Following on the heels of the American disengagement from Vietnam and the announced troop withdrawal from South Korea, the abandonment of Taiwan could seriously erode confidence in other U.S. commitments. Presently, there seems to

be no pressing need for the U.S. to run these risks by agreeing to Peking's demands. But should the Chinese communists decide to step up pressure on the U.S. to get off the fence, a serious crisis would face American leaders. The Chinese, realizing that such an ultimatum might be counter-productive, currently appear to be satisfied in playing a waiting game.

Another hindrance to improved Sino-American relations is the Soviet Union. From Peking's angle, the view is clear. In the likely event that the Sino-Soviet conflict continues with its present intensity, the Chinese would benefit greatly by warmer relations with the U.S. The perspective from Washington is quite different. U.S. foreign policy is still shaped largely by its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Given the present strategic balance between the two super-powers, a much closer U.S.-P.R.C. relationship could be destabilizing and cause the Soviets to take drastic action to improve their position. It is in the United States' interests to seek better relations with the two communist giants, but not one at the expense of the other. The Sino-Soviet conflict puts the U.S. in an advantageous, if not ticklish, position to pursue this goal.

A third hindrance to improved U.S.-P.R.C. relations is the issue of arms control. From its position of strategic nuclear sufficiency, the U.S. sees the significant improvement of any foreign government's nuclear force as against its interests. It does appear that the nuclear balance will be de-stabilized when China's might, coupled with either the

American or Soviet forces, substantially tips the scales. Conversely, Peking sees no advantage to limiting its own nuclear capability. Not until the Chinese believe they have a credible second strike capability might they become interested in negotiating arms control.

Economic relations are another matter facing the U.S. and China. In a world of increasing economic interdependence, the U.S., as a trading nation, requires access to foreign markets and natural resources. China could supply both of these in return for American technology. The present Chinese communist theme, however, is self-reliance. Bitter memories of past foreign encroachment make China reluctant to accept foreign loans and investments or enter into close economic relationships.

Lastly, it must be remembered that the governmental and economic systems of the U.S. and the P.R.C. are incompatible. Since the Fifth People's Conference in Peking in February 1978, a further rapprochement with the U.S. and other Western nations seems to be indicated in the policy statements of the Chinese political leaders. The Chinese seem to be willing to risk their possible loss of prestige with some Third World countries, whom they claim to lead against the American and Soviet hegemonists. This latest dilemma facing the Chinese, as with every other choice which the Chinese were obliged to make in the historic evolution of their policies towards the U.S., is of extreme importance to every interest group in Japan. The following chapters will examine the viewpoints

of the various policy actors as they watched the development of U.S.-P.R.C. relations--first before 1971 and, subsequently, for the contemporary period.

V. EVOLVING INTEREST GROUP POLICIES REGARDING U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS: THE BACKGROUND

Chapter Three discussed the Japanese foreign policy roles of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, the opposition parties, the central bureaucracy, the economic community and public opinion. In this chapter the background (1949-1971) for the current attitudes of these interest groups toward key issues in U.S.-P.R.C. relations will be developed.

A. THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY (LDP)

Although the LDP was not founded until October 1955, its first leaders had figured prominently in postwar Japanese policy-making as members of the rival conservative parties, the Liberals and the Democrats. Foremost among these leaders was Shigeru Yoshida who, as head of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister of the government from 1948-1954, steered his country to a close relationship with the U.S. because he believed that it was Japan's only rational avenue to national security and economic recovery.

When the American occupation of Japan ended in May 1952, the ruling Liberal Party was free to formulate an independent Japanese foreign policy. In fact, most of this freedom had been forfeited when the conservative leadership opted for military and economic ties with the U.S. Under Yoshida's leadership and backed by big business, the Liberals attached high priority to domestic economic recovery, which led to

the rejection of large-scale rearmament, which, in turn, led to dependence upon the U.S. for security.

In 1952, the U.S. and China were at bitter odds with one another over the important issues of Korea and Taiwan. In aligning Japan with the American-led Western bloc, the Liberal Party placed the country in an adversary relationship with the P.R.C. This arrangement was one of utility from the Japanese viewpoint, since they did not see China as a real threat. Although Yoshida would have preferred a more flexible China policy, under pressure from the U.S. the Liberals concluded a peace treaty with Nationalist Taiwan, recognizing it as the de jure government of China.

In Korea, the Japanese had more at stake than appeasing U.S. desires. The conservatives felt that a North Korean-dominated peninsula might have been a threat to Japan, so they were not reluctant to support American policy in that area. The ruling party also abided by the American-led U.N. embargo of strategic goods trade with the Chinese communists, even though Japan was not, at that time, a member of the United Nations.

Throughout the 1950's, as Sino-American relations remained tense, the conservative party ruled Japan without interruption and used the U.S.-Japan alliance as the linchpin of its foreign policy. There were voices both inside and outside the party which called for a more independent policy direction. But the right-wing forces within the LDP, supporters of a close association with the U.S., continued to carry the day.

During the middle of the decade, from 1953-1958, private contacts between Japan and China grew. The LDP-led government supported increased business with the Chinese mainland, although it did not officially sanction the agreements. Peking attempted to pry Japan and the U.S. apart by trying to inject political flavor into its trade relations with Japan, but it was repeatedly rebuffed by the ruling party.

The conservatives followed very carefully the Sino-American differences over Taiwan, which flared up in 1954 and 1958. In both cases, the Japanese felt relieved that a major conflict had been avoided, the American East Asian security commitment had been reinforced and Japanese economic interests in Taiwan remained protected.

In late 1959, the Chinese communists began to attack Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's pro-American policies by indirect means. They entertained several anti-mainstream LDP leaders in Peking and aided Japanese leftist attempts to block the revision of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In the aftermath of the Peking visits, the Chinese did succeed in reducing intra-party unity within the LDP regarding the China question. With or without P.R.C. support, there was considerable opposition within Japan to ratification of the revised Security Treaty. Following Diet approval of the treaty in June 1960, there was so much public protest in the form of strikes and demonstrations that Kishi resigned. The crisis subsided quickly with no real change in LDP policy.

In the early 1960's, the conservative party remained committed to dependence upon American military and economic ties. Although Japanese military capabilities were modestly improving, the U.S. Seventh Fleet was still protecting Japan's vital sea lines of communications. In 1961 about 30% of Japan's trade was with the U.S., from whom she received valuable raw materials and technology.

During this period, the U.S. and the P.R.C. were still stalemated over Taiwan, Korea, diplomatic relations and U.N. membership. In addition, a new troublespot, Southeast Asia, was coming into focus, where Washington was determined to contain communist expansion and Peking feared the proximity of the American presence. Under Hayato Ikeda the LDP took a passive stance regarding this issue, since it had no real interest in Peninsular Southeast Asia and wished to offend neither the U.S. nor the P.R.C.

Meanwhile, the Chinese communists, perhaps feeling isolated because of the growing split with the Soviet Union, were making renewed overtures for expanded trade relations with Japan. In November 1962, the semi-official Liao-Takasaki Memorandum of Agreement was signed, calling for two-way trade between Japan and mainland China to reach \$1 billion between 1963-1967.

In 1964, the P.R.C. conducted her first nuclear weapons test, and in 1965, the U.S. commenced bombing raids on North Vietnam. While these two separate events markedly increased Sino-American hostilities toward each other, LDP policy was

unchanged. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato expressed regret over the Chinese test but indicated that it would not influence Japan-P.R.C. relations. There was disagreement within the party regarding Vietnam. Most right-wingers, who placed the utmost importance on the U.S. alliance, supported the American involvement, while others, seeing no threat to Japanese interests in Southeast Asia, opposed the U.S. policy. Overall, the party policy seemed to say that Southeast Asia was a Sino-American problem and that Japan hoped to continue to improve relations with both countries. By maintaining a passive policy, the LDP also hoped to avoid arousing anti-American public opinion.

Through the years, some LDP members, particularly anti-mainstreamers, advocated closer relations with China because of intra-party political expediency. Others, however, had deeper commitments to their viewpoints. Thus, in the mid-1960's, pro-P.R.C. and pro-Nationalist China groups formed within the LDP. The Afro-Asian Problems Research Association was composed of younger Dietmen and favored a more independent Japanese policy and increased contacts with mainland China. The Asian Problems Research Association was in favor of maintaining strong ties with the U.S. and Taiwan. The latter group, made up of the mainstream of the party had the decisive influence on the formation of LDP China policy throughout the 1960's.

Politically, Japan moved closer to the U.S. and away from the P.R.C. when she signed a normalization treaty with

the Republic of Korea in June 1965. The LDP recognized Seoul as the only legitimate government in Korea and agreed to lend hundreds of millions of dollars to South Korea for economic development.

Two years later in late 1967, the U.S. elicited Sato's support for its Vietnam policies by pledging to return Okinawa "early" to Japanese sovereignty. The LDP was embarrassed, however, when President Lyndon Johnson in March 1968, proposed a de-escalation of the war in Vietnam. This announcement had a profound impact upon the conservatives, some of whom, fearing a U.S. pull-out from Asia, asked for a reappraisal of overall Japanese foreign policy. Sato "clarified" Japan's Vietnam policy by stating that the government would be ready to cope with future developments but was maintaining its present policy.

LDP fears of an American withdrawal from Asia were heightened in July 1969 when the "Nixon Doctrine" was put forth by the American President in Guam. In his informal statements to the press, Nixon stated that Asian nations would be expected to increasingly handle their own conventional defense problems. In the minds of the conservative politicians, this new strategy cast doubts on the credibility of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Against this background, Sato met with Nixon in November 1969 and received assurances that the U.S. would honor its security commitments with Japan, Korea and Taiwan.

The March 1969 border fighting between China and the Soviet Union made clear to the Japanese, as well as the Americans, the depth of the Sino-Soviet differences. The LDP followed the U.S. lead in not taking sides in the conflict and staying equidistant from the quarreling governments. Foremost in LDP minds was improving trade relations with both communist nations while keeping politics separate from economics.

As 1971 approached, the LDP could be cautiously optimistic about Japan's position in East Asia. Tensions in the troublespots were lessening and the Japanese economy was the strongest in Asia. Yet the anticipated withdrawal from Vietnam and the Nixon Doctrine caused conservatives to speculate as to future American policy in Asia. If these signals foretold a weakening U.S. protection of Japanese security and economic interests, the LDP would be required to engineer a major policy shift, with options ranging from massive rearmament to a change in superpower alignment.

B. OPPOSITION PARTIES

As detailed in a previous chapter, over the past 25 years, the parties in opposition have been minor foreign policy actors. As background for Chapter Six, however, the development of U.S. and China policies by these parties during the 1950's and 1960's will be sketched in this section of Chapter Five.

1. Japan Socialist Party (JSP)

Although the JSP had cooperated with the Liberal Party in promoting democratization in early post-war Japan, by

independence in 1952 the left-wing majority was in chronic opposition to the ruling conservative party. This faction's communist tendencies and neutralist policy orientation placed it ideologically opposite the U.S. and alongside mainland China. The smaller right wing of the JSP was stoutly opposed to communism and supported the alliance with the U.S. These and other policy differences between the two factions caused them to split into two parties in 1951.

By 1956, the socialist parties had re-united and supported the view that Peking was the only legitimate government of China. The left and right wings of the party still disagreed, however, on other points. The leftists wanted Japan to abrogate its treaty with the Nationalists and to normalize relations with Peking immediately while the rightists did not. At its 1957 Party Convention, the stronger left wing elements prevailed and the JSP adopted a "one China" policy, which stated that Formosa is a part of China and called for normalized Sino-Japanese relations and U.N. membership for the P.R.C.

In 1959, following a visit to Peking, JSP Secretary-General Asanuma declared that America was a "common enemy" of Japan and China. Thus, JSP neutralism openly shifted to anti-Americanism. As a result of the pro-communist stance, part of the right wing led by Suehiro Nishio deserted the JSP to form a new party, the Democratic-Socialist Party.

Under its new policy, the JSP, with the full support of the P.R.C., demonstrated violently against the 1960 revision of the Security Treaty. After the protests failed to prevent

ratification of the Treaty and the LDP again won a majority in the November 1960 elections, the JSP continued to bicker over structural reform and a change of direction in policy.

During the early to mid-1960's, the JSP remained opposed to American imperialism, but during this time sharp differences developed between the party and Peking. The socialists found themselves siding with the Soviets and against the Chinese on such matters as nuclear testing and peaceful coexistence. To soften the protest of China's nuclear tests, the JSP blamed the U.S. for causing the communists to develop nuclear protection.

Still, with respect to Sino-American relations, the JSP predominantly supported Peking's line. The 1959 defection of Nishio's group had not depleted the party of its moderates or right wingers. This element of the JSP continued to follow a true neutralist line, while the stronger left wing leaned to the communist powers.

In concert with portions of both the Japanese media and public opinion, the socialists opposed the American involvement in Vietnam. They tried to take advantage of the situation to make political hay and embarrass the LDP. However, the JSP was unable to ride this issue to better representation in either house of the Diet.

As the 1970's began, the JSP was the main opposition party to the ruling LDP. But its strength in the Diet had declined and factional strife prevented it from presenting a unified front. Although theoretically a neutralist party,

the more powerful left-wing element had given JSP policy an anti-American, communist-leaning flavor. Consequently, the JSP supported diplomatic recognition of Peking and all its ramifications (U.N. membership, return of Taiwan, etc.).

2. Japan Communist Party (JCP)

When the American occupation ended in 1952, the JCP was in shambles. Factional disputes had wracked the party's leadership and violent tactics had led to government repression and voter alienation. JCP alignment at the time was totally pro-Peking and anti-American.

The communists spent the 1950's rebuilding. In order to strengthen political support, the JCP abandoned the thesis of violent revolution, advocating a non-violent transition into an independent (out of the U.S. camp), peaceful and democratic government. In any showdown between the U.S. and the P.R.C. the sympathies of the JCP would clearly have been with the P.R.C. The JCP joined a Chinese-backed "united front" with the JSP and other progressives in protesting against the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty revision.

While the JCP's position vis-a-vis the U.S. and the P.R.C. was never in question, the early 1960's saw the JCP in an embarrassing position with respect to the emerging Sino-Soviet conflict. The Japanese communists tended to side with the Chinese in the dispute, although they asserted their position of autonomy and independence.

As U.S. involvement in Vietnam progressed in the latter part of the decade, the JCP called for a unified

communist opposition to American imperialism. In light of its cleavage with the Soviet Union, the P.R.C. rebuffed this plan. This disagreement, together with the JCP's rejection of the CCP's theory of violent revolution for Japan, helped to create a split between the two parties. In 1967, the Japanese communists formally broke ties with their Chinese counterparts and called for the overthrow of the CCP. At this point, the JCP re-established relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), while still pledging complete independence.

As the 1960's ended, the JCP policy toward the U.S. remained unchanged. The party opposed U.S. intervention in Asia, and, despite its sour relations with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), supported international diplomatic recognition of Peking and U.N. membership.

3. Komeito (Clean Government Party)

A newcomer to Japanese politics, the Komeito first gained national political stature in 1967 when it elected 25 members to the House of Representatives. According to one observer, "The party's foreign policy program appears to have evolved on an ad hoc basis as it has been pressed to take stands on important questions being debated in the Diet and media. In the absence of any experience in dealing with diplomatic problems, it is not surprising that the party's response has often seemed to be a product of a combination of popular nationalism, lofty but inchoate and vague political principles, and a readiness to cater to what was believed to be the wishes of the voters."⁴⁸

As the 1970's began, the Komeito supported a neutralist foreign policy position. Its China policy was opposed to the LDP's but more moderate than the other parties in opposition. The party recognized Peking as the legitimate government of China and supported its admission to the United Nations but stopped short of abandoning Taiwan, simply calling it an "internal problem."

With respect to the U.S., the Clean Government Party urged a lessening of tension in Asia by the phasing out of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Once the U.S. was out of Japan, the party reasoned, the door would be opened for better Sino-Japanese relations, and Japan would be able to pursue a true neutralist policy.

4. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)

Like the Komeito, the DSP, which was formed when the JSP split in 1959, advocates a neutral Japan. The democratic socialists, however, hold that Japan needs a strong defensive capability to ensure her national security.

Consistent with its advocacy of a rearmed independent Japan, throughout the 1960's the DSP opposed the LDP's close association with the U.S. The party felt that Japan should not become entangled in the Cold War and that a strong Japan would not need the military alliance with the U.S.

The DSP maintained a "one China, one Taiwan" policy. This approach called for diplomatic recognition and U.N. membership for Peking, while at the same time, Taiwan would be allowed to hold its U.N. seat until the inhabitants of the island decided their own future. The democratic

socialists urged better economic and cultural relations with China, but, unlike the other socialist party, the DSP's intense anti-communist feelings prevented it from developing ties with the CCP.

As 1971 loomed, the China policy of the DSP, although opposed by both Peking and Taipei, probably reflected the attitudes of most voters and Dietmen in Japan. The LDP, however, could not openly support this stance since it was being constrained by its relationship with the U.S.

To sum up this section, at the beginning of the 1970's every opposition party was advocating diplomatic recognition of Peking, U.N. membership for the communist government, and closer Sino-Japanese cultural and economic relations. Backed by public opinion (to be studied in detail later), these parties brought pressure to bear on the LDP but could do no more than embarrass the government.

With somewhat less enthusiasm, the parties in opposition all called for an end to close Japanese dependency on the U.S. In this area, they had little political leverage since more Japanese than not felt that the Security Treaty was in the interests of Japan.

Because the minority parties could not unite to form an effective opposition, they remained little more than a thorn in the side of the LDP. As we shall see, the Japanese central bureaucracy played a much more important role in formulating U.S. and P.R.C. policy.

C. CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY

Despite the fact that the ruling party in Japan is the controlling force behind governmental policy decisions, the central bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, exercises considerable influence in foreign affairs. This section of Chapter Five will pinpoint the pre-1971 attitudes of these two important foreign policy actors toward the U.S. and China.

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

From the start it should be pointed out that the Foreign Office contains deeply-rooted political divisions that prevent it from articulating a single line of governmental policy. MFA's United Nations and American Affairs Bureaus consistently and publicly supported pro-Taipei, pro-American positions until the eve of normalization with Peking. In private, they continue to espouse this line. Conversely, the ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau generally supported initiatives to normalize relations with Peking.⁴⁹

A discussion of the evolution of predominant MFA views of Sino-American relations from 1952-1971 would essentially be a repetition of the LDP section of this chapter. Various divisions of the Foreign Office opposed overall governmental policy at different times. However, the prevailing ministry philosophy during the 1950's and 1960's was that continued military and economic cooperation with the U.S. was "absolutely necessary" for Japan's survival and well-being.⁵⁰

This attitude was entirely consistent with that of the other two legs of the conservative triad, the LDP and business, and was established during the Yoshida government, when the Prime Minister dominated the conservative scene, recruited many of his former foreign ministry colleagues into his party, and reshaped the ministry staff in line with his own policy disposition.⁵¹ Not surprisingly, the large enterprises of Keidanren, which are most heavily involved in economic cooperation with advanced industrial countries, have acquired a similar policy disposition.⁵²

What operated to suppress the bureaucrats' desire for a settlement with China was a reluctance to sacrifice Japan's interests in Taiwan and the fear that a misstep might in some way antagonize the U.S. and disturb the orderly exchange of capital, goods, people and information upon which the prosperity of Japan depended. Any weakening of mutual trust and friendship between the U.S. and Japan might also have disastrous political and military consequences. The extreme caution induced by this fear was particularly evident in MFA.⁵³

This basic policy of close association with the U.S., which was so deeply engrained in the Foreign Ministry, was not similarly adhered to by all other governmental bureaucracies. Indeed, the influential MITI was often staunchly opposed to the Foreign Office viewpoint.

2. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)

During the post-war years, the two ministries which most frequently came into conflict over China policy were MFA and MITI.

To the "mainstream" of Japanese business, China trade was only one strand in a world-wide network--and not very important at that. MITI has tended to act not as a spokesman for the interests of large firms, but for the interests of the trading companies, whose activities it superintends.⁵⁴ Many of these trading companies, especially the weaker or smaller ones, did not have the strategic perspective of the mainstream and thus were extremely eager to expand trade as rapidly as possible, seizing every opportunity to move into the China market.

As far back as 1952 MITI clashed with the Foreign Office over China policy. When Yoshida's Foreign Minister, Okazaki Kazuo, refused to relax the special embargo on trade with the P.R.C. immediately after Japan gained independence, MITI openly took exception.⁵⁵ Contributing to MITI's forward-looking China policy was the fact that, during the 1950's, cabinet appointments to the post of Minister of International Trade and Industry went to open sympathizers of the Peking government.⁵⁶

In the 1960's, MITI collaborated with private business to give semi-official qualities to the L-T Trade Memorandum. MITI allowed two officials to participate in the negotiations in Peking, and later appointed minor ministry officials to the permanent mission in the Chinese capital.⁵⁷

Watanabe Yaeji, Director of MITI's Trade Promotion Bureau, stated in 1965, "The vacillating attitude of the Government toward trade with Communist China is most deplorable. Although the Government says that it will push

forward trade with Communist China with a forward-looking attitude, not a single Government official has ever been dispatched to Communist China so far. If an opportunity comes, I will visit Communist China myself."⁵⁸

Thus, MITI's dominant, if only, theme during the period being studied was expansion of trade with all countries, including China, in response to the ministry's somewhat narrow-based constituency.

In concluding this section on MFA and MITI, it must be understood that the long-standing differences between the orientation of these two ministries was never extended to the political-strategic question of an independent Japanese security posture. The Foreign Office had no objection to expanded Sino-Japanese trade but did not want this to occur at the expense of a security arrangement predicated on a common adversary relationship with Peking. MITI had no objection to the existence of the American security alliance but did not want the common adversary relationship to be intensified so as to reduce Sino-Japanese trade.⁵⁹

D. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The bureaucracy's only peer as a force capable of influencing the LDP is the Japanese economic community. In general, the mutual values and goals of business and the ruling party guide them down the same path. However, in some cases, such as Japan-China relations in the early 1970's, the immense power of the economic organizations drives the government to follow rather than lead.

Even before the peace treaty with the U.S. went into effect in March 1952, Keidanren, the "front office of the business community," took the stand that economic cooperation with the U.S. was an absolute necessity and strongly urged the government to take steps to accelerate economic cooperation.⁶⁰ As seen earlier, the Yoshida government concurred with this view and built its entire foreign policy around the framework of the U.S.- Japan alliance.

That policy did not, however, prevent the development of trade between Japan and the P.R.C. during the 1950's and 1960's. The small-scale trade that commenced between Japan and China shortly after the founding of the Peking government declined drastically with the Korean War and with the enforcement of the trade embargo by the U.S. and the Western allies. But beginning in 1952, a series of nongovernmental trade agreements between the P.R.C. and Japan resulted in growing commercial intercourse. Trade relations were terminated, however, in May 1958 following the Nagasaki flag incident.

In 1960, the two countries reopened trade contacts when China adopted the "three principles of trade," outlining the forms of trade which could develop between Japan and China. Since the new Ikeda government followed the previously-established policy of not officially sanctioning trade agreements, China solicited the assistance of the China-Japan Trade Promotion League and the Japan International Trade Promotion Association to select the private firms

(or "friendly firms") to enter into contact with the mainland Chinese.

The position of the mainstream of the business community toward the communist Chinese remained one of detachment. These leaders felt that trade with the continent should be encouraged but only as long as relations with the U.S. were not disturbed. If there were indications that modifications in policy might upset U.S.-Japan relations, the mainstream supported the government in its refusal to make such modifications.

Many small and medium-sized companies' interests diverged from those of the mainstream. In particular, weaker firms, striving for solvency on a month-to-month basis, cared very little about the strategic considerations which concerned the more secure industrial giants. These small and weak companies flocked to the Japan-China associations, eager to expand their trade. These "friendly firms," numbering about 300, most of which had fewer than ten employees, became the main trade route between Japan and China.⁶¹

In 1962 the L-T Trade Memorandum was signed allowing for long-term contracts for the export of industrial plants to China. When Sato became Prime Minister in November 1964, his pro-Taiwan attitude strained Sino-Japanese affairs. Nonetheless, despite this political obstruction, economic relations expanded rapidly in the mid to late 1960's. By 1970, Japan had become China's primary trading partner.

In April 1970, Chou En-lai, frustrated that China's attempts to use trade contacts for political purposes had not succeeded, enunciated new criteria for trade with Japanese firms. Under what became known as Chou En-lai's "four conditions," companies that assisted Taiwan or South Korea through trade or investment, or assisted the war in Indochina, were to be excluded from the China market.⁶²

This announcement caused considerable consternation within the mainstream of the Japanese business community, most of which had business connections with Peking, Taipei and Seoul. Chemical Fertilizer and Steel, the two major industrial interests that had become heavily involved in the China market, in general accepted these new conditions. Four of the nine major trading companies, all based in the Kansai area and having minor shares in the Taiwan and South Korean market, expressed their intention of supporting the concessions.

The Japanese business community, as a whole, attempted not to take sides for or against the P.R.C., adopting a wait-and-see policy. None of the economic organizations issued a formal statement, although some leaders protested China's intervention in Japanese domestic matters.

In sum, the attitudes of the zaikai, the "captain" of the Japanese economy, toward the U.S. and China was largely unchanged from the early 1950's to 1970. While other elements of Japanese business urged normalization and U.N. membership on behalf of the Peking government, the mainstream

policy remained in consonance with the other two-thirds of the conservative leadership.

E. PUBLIC OPINION

The final section of this chapter will describe the attitudes of the Japanese public toward the U.S. and China during the two decades following independence.

In the 1950's, the science of public polling was relatively unsophisticated in Japan, however, there is some evidence upon which to judge the opinions of the people.

A 1954 poll of business executives, government officials, scholars, and labor union leaders found that a majority in every category endorsed diplomatic relations with Peking (Table 1).

TABLE 1

"As to the opening of diplomatic relations with Communist China, is it desirable or not?"

	<u>Business</u>	<u>Officials</u>	<u>Scholars</u>	<u>Labor</u>
Desirable	62%	76%	90%	94%
Undesirable	11%	8%	--	2%
Can't say	27%	16%	10%	4%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Source: Lloyd A. Free, "The Dynamics of Influence in Today's Japan," Princeton, N.J.: The Research Council, Inc.(1954); cited by Nathan N. White, "An Analysis of Japan's China Policy under the Liberal Democratic Party, 1955-1970" Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1971, p. 215.

A few years later, another poll found that a plurality of Tokyo voters favored recognition for both Taipei and Peking but that more people preferred to recognize only mainland China than Taiwan (Table 2).

TABLE 2

"What do you think about the problem of recognition of Red China?"

The status quo should be maintained. (We recognize Nationalist China, but not Red China.)	15.8%
Both Nationalist China and Red China should be recognized.	40.2%
Red China should be recognized, and we should withdraw recognition from Nationalist China.	22.5%
A China to be created after unification of Nationalist and Communist China should be recognized.	1.3%
Don't know; no answer	<u>19.1%</u>
	98.9%

Source: Tokyo Shimbun, January 8, 1957; cited by White, "Japan's China Policy," p. 218.

However, in a nationwide poll conducted in late 1954, the respondents, who were allowed to pick more than one country, showed a clear preference for the U.S. over the P.R.C. 33.3% said they like the U.S. and 11.9% said they liked communist China, while 10.6% disliked the U.S. and 21.3% disliked communist China.⁶³

With respect to the Peking U.N. membership issue, the uncertainty of the Japanese people over the matter of Taiwan was apparent in 1957, as seen by Douglas Mendel's survey of citizens from Osaka and Izumo (Table 3).

TABLE 3

"Should Japan support Communist China's bid for a U.N. seat, oppose it, or abstain from voting?"

	<u>Osaka</u>	<u>Izumo</u>
Support seating of Peking	39%	15%
Oppose seating of Peking	7%	8%
Abstain from voting	29%	39%
Don't know	<u>25%</u>	<u>38%</u>
	100%	100%

Source: Douglas H. Mendel, The Japanese People and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 238.

The above tables show that during the 1950's there was considerable sentiment among the Japanese people for closer relations with mainland China. Nonetheless, a nationwide survey in 1959 showed that 53% favored cooperation with the American bloc, while only 1% favored cooperation with the Communist bloc.⁶⁴

Throughout the 1960's the P.R.C. together with the Soviet Union was the major object of Japanese fear and animosity. Between 1966 and 1968 the Japanese disliked China even more than Russia, but by the early 1970's Japanese feelings toward China began to warm considerably. (See Chart 1, Appendix A).

Table 4 shows that during this time period the majority of Japanese either favored a two-China policy, if it could be arranged, or could not make up their minds about the status of Taiwan.

TABLE 4

Japanese Opinions on China
(by percentage of responses)

February 1964		June 1967	
<u>Formal ties with Peking</u>	<u>U.N.seat</u>	<u>U.N.seat</u>	<u>for</u>
Pro	38	pro 11 con 16 don't know 11	8 Peking 31 Two Chinas -- Undecided
Con	7	8	Taipei
Don't know	55	53	Don't know

Sources: Jiji Tsushinsha, Feb. 1964, Nenkan, 1964, p. 220; and Kyodo Press (Tsushinsha), June 1967, Nenkan, 1968, p. 419; as cited by Akio Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1974," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 128.

Additionally, a 1970 Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that a plurality of respondents blamed poor Sino-American relations for Japan's China problem (Table 5).

TABLE 5

"What do you think is the biggest cause which is obstructing friendly relations between Japan and China?"

Relations between Ameerica and China	23.9%
The Sato Cabinet's diplomatic posture	15.1%
The presence of the Nationalist Government on Taiwan	13.5%
China's posture toward other nations	12.2%
Others	1.4%
Don't know; no answer	33.8%

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, May 31, 1970; cited by White, "Japan's China Policy," p. 226.

Up until 1965, as illustrated by Chart 2, the Japanese public has had a generally favorable impression of the U.S. The sharp fall in American popularity in 1965 was probably caused by the beginning of heightened U.S. intervention in the Vietnam war. The U.S. regained some popularity after the initial interest over Vietnam died down, but it slipped again during 1967-1968. The gradual deterioration of the American image in Japan during these years was most likely related to the Japanese fear of becoming involved in the U.S. military actions in Southeast Asia.⁶⁵

A series of surveys conducted twice a year since 1960 in Tokyo found that opinions toward the Security Treaty reversed over a nine-year span (Table 6). The Mainichi Shimbun questioned Japanese political party members in 1968 concerning their attitudes toward the Security Treaty and found some support for the alliance in all parties (Table 7).

TABLE 6

Japanese Attitudes toward the Mutual
Security Treaty with the U.S.
(by percentage of responses)

	<u>Pro</u>	<u>Con</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
1960 spring	20	46	6	29
1960 autumn	33	37	2	28
1962 spring	28	29	5	38
1967 spring	39	26	11	24
1969 autumn	40	22	8	30
1970 spring	36	28	7	29

Source: Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Tokyo teiki chosa no kekka, p. 72; cited by Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion," p. 137.

TABLE 7

Breakdown by Party Affiliation of Japanese Opinion
Regarding the Mutual Security Treaty with the U.S.
(by percentage of responses)

	<u>Favorable</u>	<u>Unfavorable</u>	<u>Noncom- mittal</u>	<u>Other/ No answer</u>
Total	30	20	43	7
By party support				
Liberal Dem.	48	6	41	5
Dem. Socialist	33	27	39	1
Komei	19	34	40	7
Socialist	16	39	41	4
Communist	7	72	17	4

Source: Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968; cited by Watanabe,
"Japanese Public Opinion," p. 140.

Aside from the security relationship, the Japanese people believed in 1969 that there existed a connection between their economic well-being and a close association with the U.S. (Table 8).

TABLE 8

"There is the opinion that 'it was because the American forces have defended Japan that Japan was able to develop economically after the end of the War.' Are you in favor of this opinion or opposed to it?"

In favor of it	55%
Opposed to it	26%
Other answers	6%
No answer	<u>13%</u>
	100%

Source: Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969; cited by White,
"Japan's China Policy," p. 278.

Once may generalize from the above information that during the 1950's and 1960's the Japanese were not happy about their state of relations with Peking, they would like to have had normalized relations with both Taiwan and the P.R.C., they believed communist China deserved a seat in the United Nations, and they supported the close relationship with the U.S. In other words, the decision-makers were not being supported in their policy to exclude Peking, but they also were not being given a clear direction by the people. This put the government in the difficult position of being criticized for not adopting policies which the realities of the international situation made impractical to put into effect--namely, the U.S. alliance prevented normalization with China and neither Taiwan nor the P.R.C. would accept a "two-Chinas" solution.

One of the more striking features of this analysis of Japanese interest groups is the absence of the military or the armed forces as an influential policy-making or opinion-expressing group. This absence may well be due to the unfortunate heritage of the militarists' role in World War II and the defeat of Japan. The mission of the Self Defense Force in the early years of Japan's rebirth seemed to be entirely professional--that is, providing for the defense of Japan without public expression of either individual or group views on matters of policy. As the political aspects of Japan's security problems were to grow in the years ahead, the new emergence of the Self Defense Force and

politicians' interests in the status of Japan's security was to be anticipated.

VI. INTEREST GROUP POLICIES REGARDING U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS: THE CURRENT ATTITUDES

The last chapter discussed the development of interest group policies regarding U.S.-P.R.C. relations up to the beginning of the 1970's. Taking this background into account, Chapter Six will examine the attitudes of these interest groups with respect to current Sino-American affairs. Attention will be focused on the important issues of normalization of relations, trade and resources, ideological conflict and the strategic balance.

A. LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The July 1971 announcement by President Nixon that he planned to visit Peking was a veritable shock to the LDP. The U.S. apparently had not consulted with the Japanese leadership concerning this breakthrough in relations. The impact of the U.S.-P.R.C. development shook the conservative party to its foundations. The LDP elders had bucked a great deal of external and internal opposition in supporting the U.S. policy of isolating China. By "jumping over the head" of Japan, the U.S. had humiliated the ruling party.

Determined not to be left behind by the U.S., the LDP moved quickly to normalize relations between Tokyo and Peking. Despite reluctance on the part of pro-Taiwan members of the party, business pressure could not be

resisted and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka established diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. in September 1972. The "Japanese solution" to the China problem entailed severance of formal ties with the Nationalist government on Taiwan in name only. In fact, relations between Japan and Taiwan continued almost as before. Given the 1952-1972 background of LDP policy, what are the current attitudes of the party towards U.S.-P.R.C. relations?

Through LDP eyes, normalization of relations between Washington and Peking is a most critical matter. The establishment of diplomatic relations is by itself not as important as the manner in which it is done.

As noted in an earlier chapter, U.S. policies in Asia during the past decade have raised some doubts in Japanese minds as to the strength of the American commitment to help defend Japan's national interests. The act of normalizing relations with China probably would not substantially erode Japanese confidence in the U.S. any further. However, if the U.S. were to agree to the communist conditions that call for the abrogation of the security treaty and removal of American troops from Taiwan, the powerful right wing of the LDP would be highly distressed. This group would, no doubt, interpret such a move as withdrawal of protection of Japanese economic interests on the island and a further decline in American security credibility throughout Asia.

Establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking would almost surely be followed by a step-up of

economic intercourse. Such an eventuality would result in increased business competition between the U.S. and Japan for the China market. From that angle, normalization must be treated with caution by the business-supported LDP.

Although on record as favoring improved Sino-American relations, it follows, then, that the conservative party benefits most from a continuation of the status quo. While a decrease in tension between the U.S. and China suits Japan, if the rapprochement is at Tokyo's expense, the LDP will be forced to rethink its overseas policy line. Armed neutrality and alignment with Moscow are two extreme options which are possible but for a number of reasons would be difficult and less desirable than the American alliance.

With respect to the issue of Sino-American trade and resources, the views of the LDP closely parallel those of the Japanese business community. Here, cooler U.S.-P.R.C. relations probably mean U.S. pressure on Japan to cut back economic ties with China, while warmer relations translate into increased U.S.-Japan competition for the China market.

As the most industrialized state in East Asia, Japan is in an advantageous economic situation. She exports great quantities of medium-technology equipment to the developing nations of Asia, consistently underpricing outside competition. Japanese businessmen would like to help China to industrialize without U.S. competition. In the long run, however, this policy may backfire if China reaches a position where it is competing with Japan for economic leadership in Asia.

On the other hand, if the U.S. succeeded in markedly "opening up" China, Japanese business might stand to gain. However, the current Chinese leadership seems dedicated to self-reliance and undisposed to allowing foreign investments in her economy.

Presently, the economies of Japan and China complement each other. Japan needs the raw materials that China seems to have in abundant supply, and China can use Japanese technology in modernizing her industry. Further, by importing Chinese raw materials, Japan can be more diversified in her resource dependence.

As with the issue of normalization, the Japanese would seem to be better off economically by maintaining the current situation although there is no way to be sure that normalization would result in expanded trade. Japanese businessmen, thus the LDP, probably have more to lose than gain from improved U.S.-P.R.C. economic relations.

A third issue facing the U.S. and China is the ideological conflict. The U.S., with an open society, encourages international cooperation, while the Chinese communists theoretically urge the overthrow of the capitalist system. The Chinese, however, participate in the international operations of the capitalist system on terms of monopoly dealing which they can accept. The LDP approaches the matter with pragmatism. In dealing with foreign countries, the conservatives try to separate politics from economics by not discriminating between socialist and capitalist states.

Thus an accommodation of the ideological conflict separating the U.S. and the P.R.C. would not by itself concern the LDP. In fact, the party probably would view such a development as politically stabilizing for East Asia.

The strategic balance is the last of the current issues to be examined. There can be no question that the LDP opposes the possession of nuclear weapons by China. Under the present arrangement with the U.S., Japan is protected by the American nuclear deterrent. Most conservatives still feel that the treaty is credible, but there is also a feeling within the party that in the future careful attention must be paid to the possible shifts in American attitudes. If the Japanese were to believe that the U.S. protective umbrella were to be withdrawn, then Japan would have to reassess the power structure in East Asia and embark on a new policy direction.

If, at that point, the P.R.C. had a nuclear force and was not a close ally, Japan's interests would clearly be threatened. For that matter, it would be counter to Japan's long-term interests to have any neighbor nuclear capable. For these reasons, the LDP will support efforts to limit China's nuclear stockpile.

A discussion of LDP views on Sino-American relations would not be complete without a discussion of the role of the Soviet Union in the Asian four-power system. Since normalization with China in 1972, Japan's policy has been to keep abreast of U.S.-China developments while not

drastically altering its ties with the Soviet Union. The most serious restraint on Tokyo's signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Peking is the "anti-hegemony" clause, transparently aimed at Moscow, insisted upon by the Chinese. While the ruling party wants to continue the warming trend with the P.R.C., it is also concerned with improving relations with the Soviet Union.⁶⁶

In sum, the LDP still sees Japan's best interests being met by a continuation of the close alliance with the U.S. However, if Sino-American relations grow substantially warmer Japan may perceive her security and economic position in Asia as threatened.

B. OPPOSITION PARTIES

After Sino-Japanese relations were normalized in 1972, China was no longer a "hot" domestic issue in Japan. Consequently, it was difficult to pinpoint all the views of the opposition parties toward the U.S. and the P.R.C. For the most part, attitudes toward current issues could be inferred from general party policy. It should be emphasized, however, that since 1952 opposition party foreign policy stances have not significantly affected government policy.

1. Japan Socialist Party (JSP)

The "Nixon shock" of 1971 and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China took much of the wind out of the JSP's sails. For nearly twenty years the socialists had been claiming to be the best contact between the two countries, while advocating

the popular position of closer Sino-Japanese relations. Following the 1972 recognition of Peking, the JSP had one less issue with which to embarrass the ruling LDP.

Turning to current issues, the JSP has no large stake in the matter of diplomatic relations between Peking and Washington. If China were recognized by the U.S. and Taiwan abandoned, the socialists' long-held goal would be realized--that is, China whole again and Peking further legitimized. Further, with the U.S. out of Taiwan, another blow would have been struck against American imperialism.

When speaking of the trade and resources issue, one must remember that the JSP is the "political arm" of Sohyo, the largest federation of unions in Japan. Therefore, the socialists can be expected to support any economic policy which will benefit the Japanese worker. This probably means that, for the reasons stated in the previous section, the best interests of both the LDP and the JSP are met by a continuation of the status quo in economic relations between the U.S. and China.

With respect to ideology, JSP official policy is to maintain an unarmed neutralist stance in international affairs. However, the left and right wings of the party strongly disagree on this matter. The right wing believes that Japan can only remain neutral by arming herself. The left group, backed by Sohyo and the stronger of the two elements, refuses to consider rearmament and has moved the party from a true neutral position to one which is closer to China.

The recent warming trend in Sino-American relations has caused some confusion for the socialists. They have consistently coupled with the Chinese communists to decry American imperialism in Asia. Now that Peking has toned down its criticism of the U.S., the JSP must follow suit or it will find itself in disagreement with its old partner, which may cause the party to lose some credibility. However, to support this policy shift the same U.S. actions (Vietnam, Korean troop withdrawal) which worry the LDP can be cited by the JSP as signs of declining U.S. influence in Asia. Nonetheless, it appears that if the U.S. and the P.R.C. were to set aside their ideological differences, it would embarrass the JSP.

The issue of the strategic balance also places the JSP in a quandary. The party cannot condone P.R.C. development of a nuclear capability because it has based part of its support upon the principle of disarmament; yet neither does it want to alienate the CCP. Therefore, the socialists cling to the position that abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and American military withdrawal from Asia will enable the Chinese to lay down their arms. In this manner, the JSP neatly blames the U.S. for China's nuclear force.

As one considers the JSP's foreign policy positions and specifically its perspectives of Sino-American relations, it must be remembered that the socialists have been an opposition party for thirty years and appear to have little hope

of coming to power in the near future. Some observers feel that the party has given up hope of ruling Japan and, as a permanent opponent of the LDP, may support unrealistic policies just for the purpose of opposing the ruling conservatives.

It is, therefore, somewhat ironic that, for somewhat different reasons, both the LDP and the JSP do not seem to benefit from much-improved Sino-American relations. If this development takes place, the conservatives must question Japan's new role in Asia, while the socialists would find itself opposing a China friendly with la bete noire, imperialist America.

2. Komeito (Clean Government Party)

Like the other political parties, the Komeito was surprised by the rapid chain of events leading to the 1972 normalization of relations between Tokyo and Peking.

Current Komeito attitudes toward Sino-American relations are not entirely clear. It is known that the party supports recognition of Peking and withdrawal of American protection of Taiwan. Beyond this active issue, however, the Komeito speaks vaguely of "one-worldism" and stability in Asia.

Although the Clean Government Party is not a strong voice in Japanese politics, in the near future it could possibly be invited to form a coalition government with a weakening LDP. If this were to happen, the Komeito might be induced, through enticements and concessions, to go along with conservative foreign policy philosophy.

3. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)

The 1972 "Japanese solution" to the China problem engineered by the ruling LDP closely matched the DSP viewpoint. In fact, the attitudes of the democratic socialists toward Sino-American relations are probably closer to the conservatives' than any opposition party (with the possible exception of the New Liberal Club). It is significant that the DSP is increasingly identified with the rise of "new nationalism" in Japan.

Like the LDP, it can be inferred that the anti-communist DSP sees closer economic and political relations between the U.S. and China as detrimental to Japan's interests. This rapprochement would enhance China's position in Asia. However, such an eventuality does strengthen the party's neutralist argument by demonstrating that Japan would be much more secure by providing for her own defense.

Due to its limited representation in the Diet (29 in the Lower House, 10 in the Upper House), the DSP alone is not an influential foreign policy actor. Yet because the party is closer to the LDP than the JSP on most issues, along with the Komeito it is a likely candidate should the LDP require a coalition partner.

4. Japan Communist Party (JCP)

The Japanese communists were shocked by the 1971 Nixon announcement as much as the LDP was. In fact, the JCP was distressed that Peking "could shake hands with the number one enemy, American imperialism, while remaining hostile to the JCP and the Soviet Union."⁶⁷

Despite its dispute with the Chinese Communist Party beginning in 1966, the JCP has continued to support the legitimization of the Peking government. However, the party cannot abide by any further warming of relations between the U.S. and China. While closer Sino-American economic relations for temporary purposes might be understandable, an ideological accommodation on the part of the Chinese runs counter to the worldwide communist ideal. Likewise, the JCP supported Peking's nuclear force development but not for the possibility of seeing it paired with the U.S. against the Soviet Union.

The JCP defines its role as a force combatting communism's primary enemy in the world today--American imperialism. The party claims to be neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict and would patch up its differences with Peking if the CCP would abandon its anti-JCP attitude. In the meantime, the JCP must view a closer U.S.-P.R.C. association as counter to the goals of worldwide communism.

In sum, then, current information indicates that the opposition parties feel that the warming trend in Sino-American relations may not be in the long-term interests of the parties or Japan. For the JSP and, to a lesser extent the JCP, this development represents friendship between an old friend (P.R.C.) and the erstwhile common enemy (U.S.). The Komeito and the DSP see it as a threat to an independent and neutral Japan.

Despite this general consensus, the minority parties in Japan today are not significant foreign policy actors. Because they cannot present a unified front, the parties have little chance of unseating the conservative government and are largely ineffective in the Diet. This fact is evident when one considers that the LDP reversed its stand on China not because of opposition pressure, but due to external factors.

Even though the LDP Diet majority is slim, the Japanese political power equation has not changed much over the past 25 years. Presently, it is important to understand the opposition parties' perspectives on Sino-American relations only when looking to the possibility of one or more of these groups forming a coalition government with the LDP. In such a case, an LDP partner, being in an inferior position, would likely have to alter its present policies. The minority viewpoints expressed in this section would gain significance if, in the unlikely event, the parties united in opposition to the LDP or gained broad popular support for their policies.

C. CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)

Despite the blow delivered by President Nixon in 1971, deeply-rooted pro-American, pro-Taiwan feelings continue to dominate the powerful United Nations and American Affairs Bureaus of the Foreign Ministry. At the same time, subsequent to Japan's normalization with the P.R.C. in 1972, the pro-Peking Asian Affairs Bureau gained considerable

influence.⁶⁸ Nonetheless, one researcher conducted a series of interviews and found that officials within the Minister's Secretariat and the Economic Affairs and Public Information and the Cultural Affairs Bureaus stated time and again that their commitment remained with a close relationship with the U.S.⁶⁹

It seems safe to say, then, that MFA perspectives toward Sino-American policy issues closely parallel those of the ruling LDP. In fact, since the ministry has no constituency and is not directly responsive to public opinion, the bureaucrats probably tend to be more conservative than the politicians. In any event, ministry officials normally will not go on public record as being opposed to LDP-inspired governmental policy.

In the interviews with Foreign Ministry bureaucrats mentioned above, the researcher found indications of impatience and defiance, with heavy nationalistic overtones, among younger officials. His impression was that these feelings will effect the general orientation of Japanese foreign policy, and that these "Young Turks" may be beginning to fight against post-war pacifism and "economic diplomacy" in the name of an independent foreign policy.⁷⁰

But, at the present time, traditionalist views prevail within the Foreign Office, meaning that this branch of the executive bureaucracy will be extremely wary of a closer U.S.-P.R.C. relationship which excludes Japan. If a Sino-American rapprochement were to include Japan, she would benefit from the resulting increase in regional stability.

2. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)

The improvement in Sino-American relations in 1971-1972 was a pleasant surprise for MITI. All along, the ministry had been urging official contacts between Japan and China to further economic relations. MFA and the mainstream of the LDP rejected this measure as a potential irritant to governmental policies toward the U.S. and the Republic of China. President Nixon took away part of this reasoning by announcing his trip to Peking, opening the way for increased trade between Japan and China. Even before relations were normalized between Tokyo and Peking, all of the major trading companies had entered the China market.

MITI has a very parochial view of Sino-American relations. Of the four major issues being discussed in this chapter, only diplomatic recognition and trade and resources are of primary concern to the ministry.

When Japan normalized relations with the P.R.C. in 1972, it was able to carry on its political and economic interactions with Taiwan almost unabated. This was made possible by the American security guarantee, which protected Japan's interests on the island. Since abrogation of the treaty with Taiwan and withdrawal of U.S. forces are Peking's steadfast conditions for normalization, MITI opposes this development in U.S.-China relations. Once American protection is removed from Taiwan, the booming Japan-Taiwan trade must surely suffer and Japanese investments there will be in jeopardy. Thus, while other members of the government

might regard Sino-American normalization as a signal of a waning U.S. security commitment to Japan, MITI would regard it as a business loss.

The U.S. and the P.R.C. may move to expand economic ties with or without diplomatic relations. Again, MITI would be apprehensive of this development. Although trade between Japan and mainland China is hardly "booming," the Japanese are in the advantageous position of being a primary provider of advanced technology to the developing Chinese economy. The U.S. would be in a position to challenge the Japanese in China if relations improved--a condition which is not in the best interests of MITI's constituency.

Therefore, MITI, unlike MFA, appears to have nothing to gain from immediate improving Sino-American relations. While the Foreign Office realizes that warming relations may enhance Asian stability and thus the nation's strategic security, MITI looks at the problem on a small economic scale and consequently feels a much greater degree of apprehension.

D. ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

Following the 1971 Nixon announcement, the Japanese business community moved quickly. Companies that previously had had no large amount of business on the mainland began to move to win future access. Yet, New Japan Steel board chairman Shigeo Nagano stated, "It is true that this has made it much easier for Japanese economic circles to move with an eye to China. It is delightful to have new

friends. At the same time, however, we must not forsake our old friends."⁷¹

By August 1971 the heads of the Japan Committee for Economic Development (JCED) and the Japan Chamber of Commerce (JCC), two of the four most powerful economic organizations in Japan, had taken positive stances toward Peking, and the mainstream of the business community gravitated rapidly toward the P.R.C. Prime Minister Sato was said to have been infuriated by the behavior of these business leaders.⁷² The business community seemed to realize before the government that eventual Japanese recognition of the P.R.C. was a foregone conclusion.

Turning to present-day issues, there is probably agreement among the layers of Japanese business concerning normalization of relations between the U.S. and China--but for different reasons. It seems likely that the business mainstream would welcome further relaxation of tension between Washington and Peking as conducive to Asian political and economic stability. On the other hand, being attuned to strategic perspectives, this element of Japanese business would also share the misgivings of the LDP and MFA concerning the perceived American pull-back from Asia and its implications for Japan. In the minds of these men, although they might welcome the normalization of relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C., they are fearful that this might imply the reduction of U.S. forces in Asia and the abandonment of the American security obligation to Taiwan. Therefore, their enthusiasm for the former is dampened by their fear of the latter.

The lower echelons of the business community would oppose U.S. normalization with Peking because of the concomitant loss of trade with Taiwan. Presently, these companies enjoy the best of two worlds since they are free to trade with both China and Taiwan.

Closely related to normalization is the issue of trade and resources. The Japanese business establishment has accepted the new situation rather calmly since it feels a U.S.-China rapprochement will not "immediately" open up direct trade between Washington and Peking. Yet, sooner or later, these leaders recognize that the U.S. would become Japan's biggest rival in China.⁷³ Therefore, from the trade angle, Japanese business circles are not encouraged by the warming trend in Sino-American relations. By the same token, they do not want to see any encouragement given to American economic competition in the lucrative Taiwan market.

The business community prefers to stay out of the ideological conflict between the U.S. and China, since it stands by the separation of business and politics. As a trading nation, Japan depends upon international economic cooperation and cannot choose trading partners based upon type of government. All things considered, the reduced tension created by an ideological accommodation would seem to benefit Japanese businessmen.

Economic leaders hold the same view of the strategic balance as do the LDP and the bureaucracy. That is, they

strongly prefer a continuation of the present power equation in Asia. A movement of the U.S. away from Japan toward China and/or Russia would provoke a security and economic crisis in Japan. As discussed earlier, the foreign policy options then available to Japan would be far less desirable than the present direction.

Similarly, Japan will support American efforts to limit China's nuclear force development. It appears that China will move toward arms limitation agreements only when she feels she has parity with the two superpowers. Nonetheless, Japanese business leaders, in concert with the government, view China's warheads as a potential threat to Japan's security and will bring what pressure they can to bear on China.

In short, a study of the Japanese economic community's attitudes toward the U.S. and China reveals the close harmony between the community's mainstream and government. The prevailing opinion among these leaders is that, from virtually all perspectives, a continuation of the warming trend in Sino-American relations must be watched very carefully to determine to what extent it might develop contrary to the best interests of Japan.

E. PUBLIC OPINION

Contrary to common belief, the Nixon shock did not greatly effect, in an immediate sense, Japanese opinion regarding the China issue. (Tables 9 and 10). The significant shift in opinion occurred after Prime Minister Tanaka actually visited Peking and established formal ties with China. In

polls taken shortly thereafter, about one out of three adults strongly approved his actions, another 50% felt that "it was all right," and less than 3% disapproved (the remaining 11.5% were uncommitted.)⁷⁴

TABLE 9

Effects of U.S.-China Rapprochement on
Japanese Attitudes toward China
(by percentage of responses)

	<u>U.N. seat for Peking</u>	<u>U.N. seat for Taipei</u>	<u>U.N.seats for both</u>	<u>Don't know</u>
January 1971	11	7	34	48
Late July 1971	13	6	31	49

Source: Nihon Risachi Senta, Jan. and July 1971, Yoron chosa, Nov. 1971, p. 75; cited by Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion," p. 129.

TABLE 10

Japanese Opinions on Establishing Formal Relations
with the People's Republic of China
(by percentage of responses)

	<u>Yes, Immedi- ately</u>	<u>Yes, as soon as possible</u>	<u>No need to make haste</u>	<u>Not nec- essary at all</u>	<u>Don't know/ no answer</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Mar.1970*	16	47	23	4	10	100
Apr.1971	11	44	13	1	31	100
(Jul.1971 Nixon reveals his plan to visit China)						
(Oct.1971 China is admitted to U.N.)						
Nov.1971	14	44	13	1	28	100
(Jul.1972 Tanaka forms a new cabinet)						
Aug.1972	17	45	13	1	24	100
Sept.1972	19	45	13	2	22	101

*The 1970 survey is included for reference, although it is difficult to compare it directly with the others because its questions were phrased rather differently.

Sources: Mar. 1970 results from Mainichi Shimbunsha; the others from Jiji Tsushinsha, Yoron Chosa, June 1971, p. 67; Jan. 1972; Oct. 1972, p. 75; and Nov. 1972, p. 74; cited by Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion," p. 129.

Japanese still suffered qualms of conscience in making the embarrassing choice between Peking and Taipei. In October 1972, shortly after the government made the decision to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan, only 6% of the Japanese people approved of this action without reservation and 15% expressly disapproved. 51% answered that it was "the only possible thing to do."⁷⁵

Turning to the present, there is very little Japanese public opinion information available concerning the current issues in Sino-American relations. It seems likely, however, that the questions of normalization of relations and the ideological conflict between the U.S. and China are of relatively minor importance to the common man in Japan. (In 1965, while 43% of the people were "very much interested" in Vietnam, 62% attached the same priority to traffic problems (multiple answers given)⁷⁶.) Similarly, few private citizens can be expected to be as concerned over trade competition in China as the businessmen (unless it has an immediate effect on their pocketbooks). In all probability, what little active public interest exists concerning these issues is insufficient to significantly effect government attitudes.

However, there is, quite naturally, considerable public interest in the security of Japan. Tables 11 and 12 illustrate that, although the Japanese people may have desired neutrality in 1969, most felt that Japan was incapable of providing its own defense. This feeling could have future

implications if Japan perceives that her security requirements are not being met by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

TABLE 11

"Do you think our country's defense should be conducted by our own strength?" (*Italics added*)

I think so	73.9%
I do not think so	16.0%
Other answers	0.7%
Don't know and no answer	9.4%
	<u>100.0%</u>

Source: Tokyo Shimbun, January 1, 1969; cited by White, "Japan's China Policy," p. 262

TABLE 12

"Do you think Japan's peace and security can be safeguarded by Japan's own independent power?" (*Italics added*)

Yes, it is possible to safeguard it	17.9%
It is necessary to obtain another country's cooperation	66.1%
Other answers	0.7%
Don't know and no answer	16.3%
	<u>101.0%</u>

Source: See Table 11.

Public concern over the issue of Asian strategic stability also exists. Back in 1963, when a newspaper asked Tokyo citizens: "Recent press reports say that Communist China may carry out a nuclear test shortly. If the test takes place, do you think that it will greatly endanger Japan's security or that it will have nothing to do with

Japan's security?" 68% responded that it would endanger or greatly endanger Japan's security.⁷⁷ A follow-up question asked that 68%, "What do you think Japan should do?" 71% replied that Japan should call upon Communist China to stop nuclear testing and nuclear armament.⁷⁸

Six years later in 1969, nearly 16% of the respondents to an opinion poll felt that Communist China was still a threat to the security of Japan (Table 13).

TABLE 13

"Do you think there are countries which will pose threats to the security of Japan? If there are, what are they?"

Soviet Union	20.4%
Communist China	15.6%
America	7.0%
North Korea	2.3%
Other	2.4%
(There are such countries)	(47.7%)
No country which will become a threat	16.7%
Don't know; no answer	35.7%
	<u>100.1%</u>

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, August 7, 1969; cited by White, "Japan's China Policy," p. 251.

One Japanese intellectual has assessed the current public mood in Japan as follows:

Recent international developments, including the Sino-American rapprochement, have reduced the need for Japan to choose between the American alliance and Chinese friendship, which in turn has helped to undermine the opposition to the treaty. On the other hand, these developments have given rise to the argument that, in view of the seemingly reduced international tension in Asia, Japan need rely less than in the past on the United States. Japan's response to the retrenchment of American military presence abroad has also been ambiguous. Although their fear of becoming unintentionally involved in international

conflicts through the treaty commitment with the U.S. is now greatly reduced, Japanese can no longer be sure about the U.S. intention to remain in Asia. U.S. credibility has become a growing question."⁷⁹

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The reactions of the most important group studied in this paper, the Liberal Democratic Party, to possible U.S.-P.R.C. policy developments are not difficult to anticipate. A cooling of relations between the two superpowers would increase tension in the region and, once again, put the Japanese leadership in the unpopular position of having to choose between the U.S. and China. The present condition of lukewarm Sino-American relations is almost ideal, since Japan has political and economic ties with both countries in a non-hostile environment. Normalization, by itself, does not necessarily indicate warmer relations. In the eyes of the LDP, a significantly closer association between the U.S. and the P.R.C. which tended to isolate Japan is the worst possible development. With such an eventuality, the alliance upon which the LDP has based its policy would be severely jeopardized, and Japan's role in this new equilibrium would probably require a profoundly different foreign policy direction. However, the LDP would favor a better U.S.-P.R.C. relationship if it included Japan.

The parties in opposition to the LDP government, led by the Japan Socialist Party, which holds over twice as many seats in the House of Representatives as the next largest party, are not united in their policies toward the U.S.

and China. However, they would all seem to favor cooler Sino-American relations because, on the part of the left-leaning JSP, American imperialism would again be the common enemy of the JSP and the Chinese Communist Party, and, in general, political mileage could be made against an LDP government which presumably would align Japan alongside the U.S. against the P.R.C. It follows that, since the current situation is not optimum from the opposition party viewpoint, this group does not prefer a continuation of present U.S.-P.R.C. relations. The opposition also opposes a closer Sino-American association since it might exclude Japan, and thus threaten the stated goals of neutrality and independence (and, except for the Democratic Socialist Party, disarmament). Unless these minority parties can unify their opposition to the LDP, which appears unlikely over the next few years, their impact on governmental policy will not be significant.

Table 14 indicates that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry can be expected to concur with each other, and with the LDP and business, in reacting to possible U.S.-P.R.C. policy developments. MITI opposes a deterioration of relations between the two countries because it would probably hurt Japan's economic intercourse with China, while the prevailing view in the Foreign Office agrees with the LDP that such an evolution might put Japan squarely between the Americans and the Chinese. Again, a continuation of the

present lukewarm state of Sino-American relations is seen by the bureaucracy to be in Japan's best interests. Trade-conscious MITI would not favor a warmer U.S.-P.R.C. association since it would likely entail an end to lucrative Japan-Taiwan trade and probably would produce more lively Japanese-American competition for the China market. The internationally-minded MFA would oppose a warmer Sino-American relationship if it tended to isolate Japan and thus present a threat to the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan's national security interests.

It may be assumed that the economic community holds the same views toward future U.S.-P.R.C. policy developments as do its partners in the Japanese conservative leadership, the LDP and the bureaucracy. Cooler relations between those two countries would almost certainly hurt Japanese trade with China, and, more importantly, the increased tension would likely inhibit regional economic development. In the favored, current situation, Japanese businessmen enjoy economic ties with the U.S., the P.R.C. and Taiwan. From the viewpoint of this group, a closer Sino-American relationship might yield undesirable effects: curtailment of Taiwan trade, competition between U.S. and Japanese companies in China and in the long run, a possible national security threat which could lead to a major diversion of funds from the economy into defense needs.

In the Japanese public's eyes, Sino-American relations are not an important issue today. Consequently, it is

TABLE 14

ANTICIPATED REACTIONS OF JAPANESE INTEREST GROUPS
TO FUTURE U.S.-P.R.C. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

<u>Interest Group</u>	<u>Cooling</u>	<u>Lukewarm (Present)</u>	<u>Warming Beyond Normalization</u>
Liberal-Democratic Party	4	1	5
Opposition Parties	2	4	5
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	4	1	5
Ministry of Interna- tional Trade and Industry	4	1	5
Economic Community	4	1	5
Public Opinion	6	6	6

Note: Key 1...Favor
2...Favor somewhat
3...Noncommittal
4...Oppose somewhat
5...Oppose
6...Unclear


difficult to pinpoint the attitudes of the citizenry toward possible U.S.-P.R.C. policy developments and their implications for Japan. Historically, the LDP has not been particularly responsive to public opinion. But if the Sino-American relationship undergoes a significant change, the impact upon all Japanese will be deeply felt, and at that point the popular voice may well become an important foreign policy ingredient.

The right column of Table 14 reveals a remarkable consensus in Japan regarding U.S.-P.R.C. relations. The message seems clear. Under present conditions, a move on the

part of the U.S. to solve such specific issues as conditions of trade or even the normalization of relations (without abandoning Taiwan) can be viewed by Japan only as contributing to the stability and peace of Asia. But any substantial development in relations between the U.S. and the P.R.C. which might lead to such warming of relations as the transfer of sophisticated technology or weapons systems or any other act which might tend to upset the strategic balance in Asia would be considered by Japan as running counter to the interests of Japanese of all persuasions and might therefore seriously threaten the U.S.-Japan alliance.

APPENDIX A


CHART 1
Nations Disliked by the Japanese



Source: Yoron chosa nenkan, 1960--; cited by Iatanase, "Japanese Foreign Policy", p. 125.

APPENDIX A

CHART 2
Nations Liked by the Japanese



Source: See p. 138.

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